THE NEW REPUBLIC

Conformities and Fashions

Irving Howe

Revolution of Non-Expectations

Margaret Halsey

The US and South Africa

Patrick Duncan

CIA–The Human Side

The Editors

July 3, 1961,

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T.R.B. *from Washington*

Inviting a Collision

★ It was Khrushchev who pressed the crisis button; it is well to remember that. Even after Vienna, and the bogged disarmament talks, Washington could not be sure. Then Mr. K, in bemedalled army uniform announced flatly in Moscow he would sign a peace treaty with East Germany "at the end of this year . . . and those who try to threaten us with war . . . bear the entire responsibility. . . ." The end of this year – six months! The two big ships are on a collision course.

There were three things to do: consult allies, fix contingency plans, alert the public. Without quite knowing how it came about the public suddenly discovered the crisis. The Washington press was alerted first. This came when background talks took on ominous overtones that could not be ignored – "a major risk of war"; "nearly the certainty of some form of military action" if Mr. K continues.

Critics can, of course, argue the crisis was made in Washington. We don't think so. A crisis is the last thing the West wants. Why then is Mr. K running this risk – the worst risk of nuclear war so far? The frank answer here is that he thinks time is running on his side. He underrates the West. Put more brutally he doesn't think the West can unite or that the US would fight. So there will be a hair-raising test of nerve on the brink.

Kennedy's problem is to lead the nation – and control it. He must convince Moscow of our toughness yet not slam the door. He must do this while GOP critics from Nixon down scream "timidity" and "no appeasement!" Mild proposals of Senators Mansfield (D) Montana and Cooper (R) Ky., to reexamine our Berlin position are denounced as softness. The pressure from the political right is toward non-maneuverability.

Now after six months in office Kennedy has no alternative, we believe, but to speak direct to the nation in the educational process which has been the one big lack of his administration so far. His press conference this week is the first since May 5.

Friendly critics have increasingly complained that Kennedy is not using his pulpit sufficiently. In part this is understandable. Problems are complex and the pace back-breaking (or back-straining, anyway). Kennedy has created a viable coalition in Congress which seems likely to achieve a fairly good record of legislation. He probably does not want to disrupt it with too much ideology. This year, it is argued, is an Eisenhower re-tread; next year there will be time to change to all-Kennedy whitewalls.

Speaking in Monotone

★ There is something to be said for this policy of expediency which has watered down the "urgency" slogan of the campaign. But it also shows lack of boldness and confidence. Kennedy has taken a defensive attitude toward the post-recession deficit, for example, when he should if anything boast of it. (By contrast Treasury Secretary Dillon, a Republican, told Congress cheerfully "There is a deficit – so what?"). Walter Lippmann pointed out another example of this defensiveness, when Kennedy half-apologized for the "burden" of foreign aid. The fact is this burden should be a lot bigger.

We all want the President to educate the people for us and each fresh problem – civil rights, the Massachusetts road scandals, economic needs, foreign affairs – inevitably brings hope that the White House will mount the pulpit. Of course it is impossible to take on all these jobs at once. But there is a personal aspect of this too: Kennedy tends to understate things, he dislikes melodrama and theatrics; the kind of colorful exaggeration of Al Smith, Mayor LaGuardia, FDR, does not come naturally to him. He has his own way of achieving effects. The very restraint of his somber report to the nation after meeting Khrushchev in Vienna was impressive. In the same way during the campaign when he confronted the Protestant ministers on the issue of his religion he spoke quietly, without heroics, and was all the more effective because of it.

Yet part of the President's job, maybe the big part, is to crash the cymbals and bang the drum. Things still are "urgent" in the United States. The eight years' false indoctrination that all federal spending is necessarily a bad thing must somehow be eradicated.

Half-Way Recovery

★ No matter what is said about current business recovery dangerous unemployment continues and there is every indication that taxes will once more balance the budget at too low a point for full recovery.

The Administration, we guess, has about two good business years ahead of it in the normal course of the economic cycle. Unless something of a basic nature is done meanwhile to reduce unemployment that timing will bring the customary "Eisenhower dip" just when Kennedy least wants it, in 1963-4, as the Presidential campaign warms up. Economic need and political expediency both point the same way – bold new Kennedy programs rather than current Eisenhower re-treads.

Notes

★ GOP Chairman William Miller is coming around to the notion of some kind of advisory forum of non-Congressional Republicans to help fix the party's course other than the Ev-Charlie show. . . . As a number of not-so-gentle readers kindly point out it was isolationist Hiram Johnson, not William Borah (as this column's fallible memory recalled) who gloomily stalked into the White House on Pearl Harbor eve without a word to reporters. . . . Visiting Britain this summer? Then you may be allowed to share the benefit of socialized medicine on equal terms though the cost of prescriptions has gone up from 14 cents to 18 cents. . . . Critics of Kennedy's plan for medical aid for the aged under social security might as well face it – Britain's Health Service is successful, permanent and very popular.

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THE NEW REPUBLIC *A Journal of Opinion Volume 145 Number 1 Issue 2435 July 3, 1961*
Published weekly (except for omissions of four summer issues) and distributed by The New Republic, *1244 19th St., N.W.; Washington 6, D. C. Phone: FEderal 8-2494. Single copy 25c. Yearly subscription, $8.00; Foreign, $9.00, Armed Forces personnel or students, $5.00. Advertising rates upon request. Subscribers desiring change of address should notify us at least three weeks in advance. Include old and new address.* *Copyright© 1961, by Harrison-Blaine, Inc.* *Item g. Second class Imprint, reading Second Class Postage Paid at Washington, D. C.*

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F. R. Ruskin, Assistant to the Publisher

Contributing Editors:

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Rallying 'Round What?

The press is being very responsible these days. It is not only reporting the battle for Berlin. It is engaged in the battle. We are warned by Joseph Alsop that we must not be "soft-boiled" and by Eric Sevareid that any willingness to renegotiate the status of West Berlin might weaken us. William S. White rebukes those who indulge in "public discussion" of the Berlin issue. Editorial opinions on the mounting crisis and the need for "standing firm" appear in news columns under banner headlines. It is all very patriotic, but what does it mean?

It means that the press wishes to help the President convince Mr. Khrushchev that this country is united against any tampering with the freedom of West Berlin, and on that general proposition we can all unite. If the urgencies of psychological warfare require all of us to proclaim our determination to stand by freedom morning, noon and night, let us proclaim it. But precisely what are we proclaiming? Does the press wish to lend itself to a campaign that propagandizes not merely Mr. Khrushchev but the American electorate, the purpose of which is to rule out any status for Berlin other than the present one? Does it wish to foreclose the possibility of negotiating a new statute, endorsed by all governments concerned, which might protect the people of West Berlin as well as they are protected today, and perhaps better? Standing firm is fine, if there is something firm on which one takes his stand. But what, in this instance, is our ground?

Unless the United States chooses to threaten war should the Soviet Union conclude a peace treaty with East Germany, there is nothing that can be done to prevent the Russians taking that step. Nor would the signing of such a treaty in and of itself place the freedom of West Berlin in any greater jeopardy than it has been for 10 years. Nor, apart from threatening war and meaning it, is the US able, nor has it been for a decade, to compel the Soviet Union or the East Germans to accept our view that Germany should be reunited through free elections. That possibility for the time being is academic. And to stand firm on an academic proposition is pure recklessness.

If it is the East Germans to whom the Russians turn over their authority, then it is with the East Germans that we must deal on unimpeded access to West Berlin and the right of the West Berliners to govern themselves as they wish. On both of these, firmness indeed is required. But firmness is not a policy; it is a spirit of resoluteness, and it is not incompatible with negotiation.

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CIA—The Human Side

So far, in discussing the Central Intelligence Agency, *The New Republic* has described how this mammoth, semi-secret agency of government, rivalling the Department of State in manpower and exceeding it in resources, has gathered to itself a variety of tasks that give it in practice an independent voice in policy making. These tasks include the assembling and analysis of overt information from abroad, planning and staging para-military operations, subsidizing foreign political and propagandistic movements and ferreting out information that cannot be obtained in the open market. We can be sure that all the results have not been bad; but we can be equally sure that neither we, nor the Congress, nor even the President knows what all the results are. How many CIA fingers are in how many pies has been and remains a mystery. If accountability is to be restored to the conduct of foreign affairs and the President is to have the reliable intelligence advice he needs, major surgery on CIA is mandatory.

But the defects are not attributable solely to CIA's bigness, its unaccountability, its visibility or the diversity of its duties. There are human weaknesses, some of them endemic to any clandestine organization. To begin with, a secret operation, if it is to be secret, is relatively free of normal checks and balances; it enjoys a protected status. But because it is protected, it is always in danger of being staffed by too many beans out of the same pod. Being less subject to informed, outside criticism as to the steps by which they reach a point of view, intelligence agencies must depend upon their own colleagues to act the part of the devil's advocate – to bring unpleasant facts to the fore.

Whether or not there is a typical CIA agent, observation suggests that there is a typical CIA analyst, and that the mechanism of recruitment, selection and retention in the CIA comes to favor the "safe man." This is a judgment that must be made with some reserve, for however diligently an outsider digs in to CIA, he can never reach bottom. He must rely on samples. For example, Lewis A. Dexter, who has been employed on intelligence projects and has known CIA, the OSS and British Intelligence, reports that at a late stage in their recruitment, CIA employees "were introduced to prospective fellow workers who could blackball them as unacceptable." He believes that it should have been if anything, the other way around: "People should be chosen to work on the same area and problem who are just as different as possible, provided they are willing to communicate with each other." Can this be done?

No one, of course, can be employed in Intelligence who has not been checked and double-checked. And well-intentioned as the security system is, it is stacked against the man who may have been involved in Popular Front movements from 1935 to 1941. Yet these are the very people whose sympathies and knowledge could be most valuable. An ex-Communist who has "transcended" his youthful views but has not become an apocalyptic proponent of inevitable war might make a better analyst of what is happening abroad than an ex-Communist who has become violently and aggressively anti-Communist. Were one to look for the most accurate interpretation of Cuban attitudes, they might be found among, say, Puerto Ricans who 15 years or more ago engaged in left-wing riots at the University – if, as is likely, some of them have matured but not to the point of denying their earlier enthusiasm for social justice. To see clearly what is happening in this revolutionary period and to understand what one sees, a high degree of sensitivity is required to the subtle gradations of left-wing politics and an almost instinctive appreciation that the cloak of anti-Communism covers a multitude of evils. Whether most CIA employees have that sensitivity and that appreciation is open to question.

In part, this is the result of the abnormal isolation of intelligence agents – and not all of them are "spies" – from the world around them. When they are abroad, they are cut off more than others from the very foreigners whom they are supposedly influencing and from whom they are supposedly learning. Any concealed community develops its own patterns of selection, of value and of prestige – all the more so if the community does not require its members to quit it at intervals, to be freshened from time to time by the sounds and smells of other worlds. Its members develop a particular way of looking at events, exaggerating that and minimizing this, not because these exaggerations and minimizations reflect the real situation but because the community tends to become an echo chamber of its own wishes. Prudence and skepticism, the appropriate attitudes for an intelligence service, give way to a boastful arrogance, and an arrogation to oneself of a monopoly on wisdom. Thus, one CIA official can speak blandly of the possibility that "we might have to throw a couple of 'nukes' [nuclear bombs] into Laos"; another can refer airily to having the Bandung Conference "sewed up."

"Nothing was simple in that world of espionage and counter-espionage, treachery and counter-treachery, vengeance and vendetta," Rebecca West wrote some years ago in *The Meaning of Treason*, "and complication is to the soul what condiments are to the palate and alcohol is to the nervous system. . . . Sweet it is to be not what the next man thinks one, but far more powerful; to know what he wrote in the letter he was so careful to seal before he sent it for quite a different person's reading; to charm the confidences from the unsuspecting stranger; to put up one's finger through the whimsical darkness and touch the fabric of state,

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and feel the unstable structure rock, and know its one's own doing and not a soul suspecting it; and to do all this for nobility's sake. It is the misfortune of our age . . . that the life of the political conspirator offers the man restricted capacity but imaginative energy greater excitements and satisfaction than he can ever derive from overt activities."

Deception leads so effortlessly to self-deception and then to an attitude of "toughness" which assumes, as Djilas wrote of the Communists in his book *The New Class*, "the end is important . . . everything else is trifling." The life of mysterious deeds done in the dark may attract the adventurous, the daring and often the dedicated, but it may attract too, especially if the pay and tenure are good, the unscrupulous, the furtive or simply the second-raters for whom the rigors of exposed competition are too severe. It nourishes a cynicism that life will not support, for it relies almost entirely for its success on what money can buy. It is known, for example, that "Frank Bender" – the Washington desk officer of CIA chosen as go-between with the Cubans – was a man of very limited acumen or tact. ("We are *not* mercenaries," one of the most impressive of the exile leaders who worked with "Mr. Bender" cried; "and we cannot fight Castro and the CIA at the same time.") Mr. Bender has many counterparts in CIA, richer in cash than in intellectual or inspirational leadership, capable of persuading others that Americans want to help them fight *their* battles, rather than having them fight ours. They will still be there – doing what only a few others and god know – if the shake-up in CIA turns out to be no more than a new name for CIA and the retirement of its director, Allen Dulles.

Famine in China?

Reports have been mounting of a major food crisis in China threatening the very life of the regime – a crisis which is said to reflect famine or near famine conditions and an acute shortage of industrial raw materials that has brought factories to a standstill.

Chinese Communist leaders are driven by an overpowering impatience to overtake – as soon as possible – first Russia and then the United States as the leading industrial and military power in the world. To this end, all the energies of the state have been concentrated on building up heavy industry as rapidly as possible, at the expense of agriculture and, to some extent, consumers' goods as well. The objective in agriculture has been to produce just enough to more or less maintain standards of food consumption – not to raise them – and to permit the state to squeeze all it could out of the peasants to finance the production of machinery, equipment and investment goods of all kinds. Agriculture was kept on a short investment ration and the reward for the peasant's labors was kept to a minimum. From the very beginning, the Communists were not willing to devote enough resources to develop domestic fertilizer production or to import fertilizer in quantities which could have significantly raised agricultural yields. At the same time, in order to check increases in peasant consumption, new forms of agricultural organization were tried out – each involving progressively tighter controls.

There have been three good harvests – in 1952, 1955 and 1958 – and each of these marked the inauguration of some major new move: the first Five Year Plan in the first case, collectivization of agriculture and nationalization of industry in the second, and the introduction of the communes in the last. But each of these good harvests was followed by two or more poor ones. This has given the whole pattern a zig-zag character, with large outpourings of effort and major surges forward at a time of favorable harvest followed by a slowing down and a pulling back afterwards.

In this sense, the unfavorable weather conditions of 1959 and 1960 were nothing unusual. But under the impact of prolonged neglect, bad planning and mismanagement the harvests were particularly poor. For instance, the leadership, falling victim to its own upward-biased crop reporting system, thought – on the basis of the very high yields reported for 1958 – that China's food requirements could be met by intensive cultivation on a much smaller acreage. So, the area sown to winter wheat and small grain was reduced in the fall of 1958, contributing to a poor crop in 1959.

As a means of coping with extreme weather fluctuations, the Communists were determined to diminish the damage by droughts and floods. They initiated the mass labor mobilization schemes of 1958 and 1959 with this in mind. As it turned out, unskilled labor using its bare hands could build only primitive earth dams and shallow irrigation ditches which could not withstand the force of major floods or droughts. At the same time, labor was mobilized for the production of steel in backyard furnaces and for other small-scale industry projects. This mass mobilization created acute labor shortages in agriculture; fields went uncultivated.

In the meantime, Chinese population has been growing at about a 2 to 2.5 percent rate a year, and all of the available evidence suggests that since 1952, the food supply has barely kept ahead of population expansion for the period as a whole. The food shortages are there, they are acute, there is no question about it. Unless the situation was serious, the Chinese would not use their precious foreign exchange to place huge orders for grain from Canada and Australia.

After all is said and done, however, these are *shortages* rather than *famines*. There is no evidence of mass starvation and mass deaths. Clearly there is an over-

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whelming sense of exhaustion and dissatisfaction. But with a monopoly of terror at its disposal and with no alternative center of power and of political organization in the society, the stability of the regime is assured so long as such economic crises are temporary. Should a crisis of such proportions persist for five to ten years in succession, the situation might be quite different, but this is most unlikely. Large-scale import of grain will in itself contribute to a temporary alleviation of the situation. Moreover, as in the recent past, industrial investment will be temporarily cut back, the tax pressure on agriculture will be reduced, and various other measures – such as the concession on private plots to the peasants – will be taken to provide relief.

Given a backward and as yet technologically unchanged agriculture on the one hand, and the objectives of the Chinese Communist regime on the other, the economy will continue to move forward by spurts. The present crisis is not a crisis of the system, but a crisis within it. To assume otherwise is wishful thinking.

Making an Administration

The June 16 Gallup poll revelation that 74 percent of the public approves of President Kennedy's conduct of his office (11 percent disapproving) tells only one part of the story. The other part is reflected in an account in *US News & World Report* of "a new team in Washington still struggling to get its feet on the ground." It is reflected in a strongly pro-Administration Senator's troubled question as to why, considering the deterioration of hemispheric solidarity and the priority given the "Alliance for Progress," the appointment of an Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs was so long delayed. It is reflected in a Capitol staff man's account of baffling difficulties in trying to find within the Executive establishment answers to substantive questions in foreign policy. It is reflected in a puzzled discussion among second-echelon officials as to where the real – as distinguished from the formal – channels to the White House lie, or precisely what policy authority is exercised by Department or Agency heads appointed by Mr. Kennedy. In sum, the criticism is heard that while a first-rate collection of people has been brought into government services these past 5 months, we do not yet have an Administration.

Reports of the President's making inquiries on varieties of topics direct to desk officers in the State Department and busying himself with reading the diplomatic cables before anyone else, have been taken as signifying a reestablishment of Presidential leadership in foreign policy. The frequency with which he picks up the telephone has been regarded as evidence that the President is "on top of things." Goodwill and fact-finding missions by the Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Food for Peace director, Adlai Stevenson, Dean Acheson, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., etc., have been taken as visible signs of new purposes. Motion has been mistaken for movement.

From many sides the President has been applauded for wholesale abolition of committees – as if finishing off moribund coordinating committees could achieve the coordination required in all government. At first, inspired perhaps by Richard Neustadt's analysis of how the Executive should function, Mr. Kennedy seemed bent on reducing the White House staff so as to give himself more direct access to the operating agencies of government. But the staff is not much smaller than it was in the Eisenhower era; indeed its responsibilities, not always sharply defined, seem to be greater, and one result is longer hours, more fatigue and less certainty about who is responsible for what. Even the tendency of the President to promote redundant staff efforts – such as having a multiplicity of task forces seized of one problem and all working independently of each other – has been accepted favorably; perhaps because this is reminiscent, to some, of Franklin D. Roosevelt's methods, in contrast to the more rigid, staff officer approach of General Eisenhower.

It may be that the President thinks of the Executive establishment as an enlarged version of a Senatorial staff. Skipping echelons is on a par then with a Senator's just asking the second man down the line a question when the top man isn't around. It is a refreshingly informal way of running the show except that it doesn't work in the White House. The great creative Presidents are those who adapted themselves drastically to the incomparable responsibilities of the office. The office *did* change Franklin Roosevelt, Jefferson, Lincoln and Truman. It left Coolidge and Franklin Pierce about as it found them.

The Way the Money Goes

An increase in Presidential authority over economic policy is called for in a lengthy report just handed to Mr. Kennedy by the Commission on Money and Credit, a private study group that has been at work for three years. The CMC calls on Congress to delegate to the President power to vary the basic 20 percent personal income tax rate by five points, up or down, as a countercyclical measure. His action would go into effect within 60 days, if not vetoed by Congress – just as Reorganization Plans are handled and as the Administration has proposed be done with certain farm programs. Secondly, his influence over credit policy would be enhanced by reducing the Federal Reserve Board from seven to five members and by timing the four-year

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terms of the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Fed to permit a President to choose his own chairman at the beginning of his Administration. (Chairman Martin's term does not expire until April, 1963.)

Since the President is held politically accountable for prosperity in any case, and is required by the Employment Act of 1946 to devise programs to promote maximum employment, production and purchasing power, these steps to increase marginally his formal authority over important instruments of economic policy are logical steps in the direction of making his power commensurate with his responsibility. Executive variation of tax rates has been urged by an increasing number of economists in recent years and is desirable on grounds of speed and flexibility of the government's response to shifting economic conditions. Likewise, free choice for a new President in appointing the Chairman of the FRB is as important as free choice of Cabinet members.

Other proposals include a clarification of the public nature of monetary policy by giving the Presidentially-appointed FRB authority over the day-to-day sales and purchases of government securities, now exercised by an Open-Market Committee composed of five Reserve Bank Presidents, not appointed by the President; mandatory inclusion of all federally-insured commercial banks in the Federal Reserve System; and removal of both the legal ceiling on the national debt and the interest ceiling on new government bonds.

The measures suggested, mild as they may be, constitute a politically-charged bundle. Congress will not take easily to the notion of sharing its taxing powers with the President – though precedent already exists in the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act. Some officials of the Reserve Banks and many commercial bankers will object strongly to even the slightest increase in Presidential authority over the Fed, whose independence has become a dogma of conventional wisdom in recent years. Yet the Commission's work has the logic of the Employment Act – and of necessity – behind it, and the report should make easier the way of future Presidential recommendations along the same lines.

"A Bit of Sleight-of-Hand"

The Supreme Court ended its judicial year last week with a bang and a whimper. The bang exploded quite unexpectedly in the reversal of the conviction of a lady named Dollree Mapp, who had been found guilty by the courts of Ohio of the crime of knowingly possessing obscene books and pictures. According to Miss Mapp's story, the items in question belonged to a former roomer and she had packed them away against his expected return. In any event, it certainly did not appear that she had any desire to circulate the materials publicly. They came to light only when three Cleveland police officers, apparently acting without a warrant, forcibly invaded Miss Mapp's home. Nor were they even looking for pornography.

One member of the Court – Justice Stewart – thought Miss Mapp's conviction should be set aside on First Amendment grounds. But Justice Clark – in an opinion concurred in by Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black, Douglas and Brennan – chose another and more far-reaching ground: The invasion of Miss Mapp's home was an unconstitutional search and seizure. Therefore, said Justice Clark, the materials lawlessly taken from her custody should not have been admitted as evidence against her.

The majority thus introduced into state criminal trials a vital safeguard which has been a part of federal procedure for nearly half a century. In 1914, the Supreme Court held that evidence seized by federal agents in violation of the Fourth Amendment's prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures could not be received in evidence in a federal criminal case. In the next three decades approximately a third of the states adopted the federal rule as their own. But it was assumed through this period that there was no *federal* constitutional mandate compelling such state conformity, since the Fourteenth Amendment merely requires the states to accord "due process of law" and does not repeat the particularized injunction of the Fourth Amendment. Then, in 1949, the Court in *Wolf* v *Colorado* unanimously held that the Fourteenth Amendment does guarantee freedom from lawless search and seizure at the hands of state officials. But six of the members of the Court, in *Wolf*, declined to take the additional step of imposing on state courts what Justice Rutledge, in dissent, termed "the one sanction – exclusion of evidence taken in violation of the Amendment's terms – failure to observe which means that 'the protection of the Fourth Amendment might as well be stricken from the Constitution'."

Since *Wolf* was decided, several more states have voluntarily adopted the federal exclusionary rule. Yet approximately half the states have persisted in paying mere lip-service to the prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures. *Mapp* v *Ohio* should serve to impose on all state courts the standard which has so long characterized federal criminal trials.

But if *Mapp* v *Ohio* was a bang, *Poe* v *Ullman* was most certainly a whimper. Here the Court refused – for the second time in 20 years – to pass on the validity of the noxious Connecticut statute which, on pain of imprisonment, prohibits the use of contraceptives.

The case was brought by C. Lee Buxton, Chairman of the Yale Medical School's Department of Obstetrics. Joined with him as plaintiffs were two of his patients, "Jane Doe" and "Mrs. Paul Poe." One of these ladies is

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very likely to die, if she conceives again; the other would, in all probability, give birth to a mongoloid. Dr. Buxton could not, because of the Connecticut statute, prescribe appropriate precautions for his patients. Therefore, they sought to enjoin the prosecuting attorney from enforcing the law which they regarded as an unconstitutional threat to life and an unconstitutional impairment of personal and professional liberty. When the Connecticut courts sustained the statute, Professor Fowler V. Harper of the Yale Law School appealed the case of Dr. Buxton and his patients to the United States Supreme Court.

Five members of the Court, led by Justice Frankfurter, decided that the plaintiffs would run no real risk of being prosecuted, even if they did violate the Connecticut statute. Therefore, said the majority, there was no immediate "controversy" between the plaintiffs and the state of Connecticut. The majority conclusion did not stem from any admission by the prosecuting attorney that he would wink at violations – but rather from the fact that, despite the widespread sale of contraceptives in Connecticut drugstores, only one prosecution has been brought under the statute in 80 years since it was enacted. According to Justice Frankfurter, this history demonstrated "a . . . tacit agreement" by the state not to enforce this particular law.

The fact remains, of course, that, by force of the statute, Dr. Buxton and other law-abiding Connecticut physicians will not prescribe the protecting device which Mrs. Poe and Mrs. Doe need.

Four members of the Court – Justices Black, Douglas, Harlan and Stewart – dissented, perceiving a genuine controversy imperatively demanding judicial resolution. And Justices Douglas and Harlan went further – they reached the merits of the case, and declared the Connecticut statute to be, in their view, unconstitutional. Said Justice Harlan, "I believe that a statute making it a criminal offense for *married couples* to use contraceptives is an intolerable and unjustifiable invasion of privacy in the conduct of the most intimate concerns of an individual's personal life."

Under Justice Frankfurter's view of the case, however, there would appear to be no way open to a full judicial test of the Connecticut law unless and until these or other Connecticut residents deliberately violate the law and risk grave criminal penalties. For it is clear – it must even be clear to the Court – that there is no political avenue to repeal of the Connecticut law. The law was written in the Connecticut of 1879 at the dictation of the prurient Anthony Comstock – but it survives the Connecticut of 1961 because the Church wills it that way.

"I fear," wrote Justice Harlan of the Supreme Court, "that the Court has indulged in a bit of sleight-of-hand to be rid of this case."

Europe and the Farmers

If there is one political principle on which East and West might agree it is that, of all sections of society, the farmers are the most difficult to govern. In the last few weeks we have had more evidence of this as the farmers of Britain and the Continent have erected new obstacles to European unity.

One of the things which divides the six nations in the Common Market from the Outer Seven is that the former are committed by the Rome Treaty to seek a common policy for agriculture – one that assures a "fair standard of living for the agricultural population." The search for such a policy has scarcely begun, yet French farmers are getting restive; they supported the Common Market in the first place because they hoped it would create the opportunity for getting rid of their surplus production. But German farmers have been determined to maintain the protection they now enjoy against foreign competition, not unlike the wool growers in the arid regions of the US.

The French Government has formally warned West Germany that unless a start is made on devising a common agricultural policy, France will oppose further dismantling of barriers to trade in industrial products. But what can Bonn do? Chancellor Adenauer dare not arouse the hostility of German farmers until the general elections are over in September.

Meanwhile the British Government is running into heavy weather with its farmers on the same issue. If Britain joins the Common Market she will have to switch to protecting her agriculture by the Continental method of tariffs and quotas instead of subsidies. In theory British farmers, whose standard of living is higher than that of their counterparts across the channel, might do as well under the continental system as under subsidies, but they fear that the consequent rise in food prices will lead to a decline in consumption. Moreover they would in any case have to pay more for their feed stuffs. The government has therefore felt obliged to pledge that Britain would not associate itself with "the Six" unless satisfactory arrangements are made for British agriculture.

When it first became clear that the Macmillan Government was thinking of joining the Common Market anguished Tory backbenchers predicted that the Conservatives stood to lose up to 80 agricultural seats because of the farmers' indignation. A more sober estimate has been made that not more than eight Conservative seats would be in jeopardy. The farm vote in Britain is concentrated mainly in areas which are overwhelmingly Conservative in any case, and for other reasons. Oddly enough, the only unsafe Tory agricultural seats are in East Anglia where the farmers are most efficient and least fear entry into the Common

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Market, but where large-scale farming has produced an agricultural proletariat which is turning Labor.

Nevertheless the farm vote (only five percent of the total British electorate) is a myth which still has as great potency with Parliament as with Congress. Agricultural unrest combines with growing concern in the Conservative Party about the dangers to the Commonwealth if Britain weds itself to Europe, and with increasing doubt in the government itself whether France will consent to the changes in the Rome Treaty which Britain would demand as the price of entry. The prospects of an early British bid to join the Common Market are dimmer today than they were a month ago.

Hastening Slowly Forward

The White House foreign aid program is beginning to make its way through Congress, as gingerly as a man venturing across a mined field. The foreign policy committees of the House and Senate are holding hearings that started during the first week in June on the authorizing legislation. When they have finished and the respective branches have passed legislation and both branches have enacted a compromise, the road will have been cleared to start all over again. The appropriations committees, perhaps toward the end of July, will then call hearings, and eventually a compromise appropriation will be passed. What Mr. Kennedy wants is $4.8 billion in appropriations (about $2.9 for economic and $1.9 for military assistance); the merger of the International Cooperation Administration and the Development Loan Fund into a new Agency for International Development (AID); and a change in financing of development loans. Instead of depending on annual appropriations, he wishes a long-term Treasury borrowing authority, $900 million for the coming year, and then $1.6 billion a year for four years. This would permit more effective planning and more leverage on recipient countries.

Though the requested legislation hardly poses any novel problems after 13 years, opposition to it is as great as ever and perhaps greater. Every added year in the record of accomplishment inevitably adds some new material for criticism about waste, corruption, inefficiency, poor aim and low yield. Yet the justification remains the same: self-respect and security oblige the richer to help the poorer.

Earlier Administrations have asked Congress for long-term borrowing authority, but the controversy will be hotter this year because of a suspicion that Kennedy really means it. This is the issue of "back door financing" which makes a convenient and comfortable assembly area for all who oppose the program on whatever grounds. Increasing competition in the domestic market from producers in low-income countries has stimulated further resistance which has its sights trained on the inevitable fact that if the aid program pays off, foreign competition is going to increase accordingly. The balance of payments problem, although easing, makes another handy argument for the antis.

It seems incredible that after all these years it should take so long for the Administration to launch a program in Congress and that Congress should feel impelled to expend so much time and debate on it. The President is not without fault. Possessed of a good task force report on foreign economic policy, including aid, he dallied. He approached the staffing of the old aid agencies as if it were not his paramount intention, which it was, to give the whole administrative structure a shaking up it badly needed. Thereby he hampered his own efforts at reorganization. He sent an eloquent message to Congress in March which contained no details, and a detailed message on May 26 which contained no eloquence. Not until June 8 did he address himself vigorously to the subject again. Even then he seemed to be bearing out Walter Lippmann's judgment that explanation bores him; he gave cursory reference or none at all to the high objectives of social and administrative reform among recipient nations, and to the striking promise of helpful partnership by other industrialized nations. Basically, however, the program is good, and better than its predecessors.

Freedom Academy

The bill calling for establishment of a new government agency to be called "the Freedom Academy" to prescribe doctrine by which the United States and friendly countries are to conduct the Cold War lies before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Two of the departments, State and Justice, have been solicited for their views, and reportedly there is some difference between them – Justice being tentatively inclined to look more favorably on the project than State. When a similar bill was up for consideration in the preceding Congress, the Department of Justice took a negative view. We trust that its wisdom in such matters will prove not to have deteriorated in the meantime. Another government agency to rove the field of foreign policy is something we need like a hole in the head.

The main arguments against the proposition can be adduced from the arguments of its proponents. One appeal on its behalf comes from a Chamber of Commerce in Florida. It refers to the "recent pathetic story that emerged of the John Birch Society," which it describes as composed of "good and substantial citizens" and led by "a sincere and honest New England businessman" whose fault lay in plunging "into the uncharted anti-

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Communist drive without education in or understanding of it."

The Freedom Academy presumably would do the job right – with the taxpayers' money. "This obvious, simple and irreducible measure," so the appeal continues, would make "sense of the mishmash of foreign aid and development, information programs, Peace Corps, disarmament proposals and diplomacy, which have brought our side one defeat or stalemate after another for 16 years."

Anyone who is skeptical of setting up a new agency to superintend the Cold War is tagged as defective in allegiance. "It has no opposition other than from our enemies and the fair-weather friends of our enemies," the appeal declares. It takes note of objections among "several government departments" and accounts for their attitude on the basis of "the belief, which appears to be commonly held, that many of these agencies have been and are currently infiltrated by followers of the Communist doctrine."

Pesos and Politics

Inured as it is to patronage and graft, Manila came close to being shocked by the excesses of last month's Nacionalista Party convention. Constitutionally, President Carlos P. Garcia, who succeeded to office following the death of President Ramon Magsaysay in a plane crash in March, 1957, will, if re-elected in November, be required to retire before the expiration of his new term. Since the Nacionalista nomination for the Vice Presidency therefore carries high Presidential prospects, a vigorous convention was clearly indicated. No one expected, however, that the pesos would flow quite so freely. Candidates bid for delegates' support with free accommodation, free night-clubbing, with all the trimmings, and even handouts of high peso notes. One delegate reported that he was offered 1,200 pesos by one candidate, 1,500 by another and 2,000 by a third: being an honest man, he took the lot and gave his vote to the highest contributor.

There is little to choose between the two main political parties in the Philippines, the Nacionalistas and the Liberals. Both consist of individuals clustered around large sources of wealth, and members move freely from one to another. Since the ruling party has greater opportunities to accumulate wealth, it also tends to attract the greatest support; for these reasons, and at this stage, prospects are for a Nacionalista victory.

To outsiders this is all somewhat curious evidence to support the Filipinos' claims to possess what they like to describe as the "show-window of democracy in Asia." Land reform is still a crying need: the quiescent Huks are not without their friends on the plains of Luzon; and the Communists are trying to infiltrate the Manila Establishment. But the claims are not entirely spurious. With a candor that is sometimes excessive, the press exposes every sordid peso-peddling deal that comes to its attention. Certainly, few Filipinos can claim ignorance of who and what they are voting for: the remedy is in their hands, and, even more importantly, seems likely to remain in their hands for a long time.

Alliance for Progress

The demonstrations in Latin America to which a correspondent refers in his report from Rio in this issue underscore the chronic instability of all Latin America. The continent's population continues to increase at a rate of 2.8 percent a year, about the highest for any area of equal size in the world; meanwhile the prices received for such major exports as sugar, coffee, copper and crude oil have fallen drastically. As a consequence of Castroism, the recession at home, and better opportunities elsewhere, new US private investment in Latin America plummeted from $1.4 billion in 1957 to $260 million last year, a loss immensely larger than anything the US Government is likely to put up. And in Havana, cockier and more openly pro-Soviet than ever, Fidel Castro is stepping up his hemispheric campaign to take advantage of increased social tension.

Despite the Stevenson tour and the Administration's bold rhetoric about "a vast effort, unparalleled in magnitude and nobility of purpose," our Latin American policy still suffers from confusion and maladministration. Carl B. Spaeth's rejection of the long-unfilled post of Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs prompted a hurry-up appointment of career diplomat Robert Woodward. Ambassador Woodward is reported to be a "nice man." The CIA, the State Department, A. A. Berle's Special Task Force, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. and Richard Goodwin in the White House, have all had a hand in shaping policy; so have individual Congressmen like Harold Cooley (agriculture) and Otto Passman (foreign aid). Senator Humphrey complains (and he is seconded by Senator Morse) that foreign aid officials have blocked the development of cooperatives in Latin America, that there is still far too much emphasis on military assistance and that the Inter-American Development Bank has too key a role ("I never heard of a bank being in charge of a revolution – not even a soft revolution").

With the Organization of American States meeting in Uruguay next month to implement the Alliance for Progress, it is essential that lines of authority and policy be clearly drawn and that the US delegation be guided by precise knowledge of how much and under what conditions the US is prepared to help its neighbors.

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AFTER 16 YEARS, NON-WESTERNERS WANT A CHANGE

Reorganizing the United Nations

United Nations

Upon the direction of the General Assembly two years ago Mr. Hammarskjold appointed a "Committee of Experts on the Review of the Activities and Organization of the Secretariat," composed of members from the United Kingdom, the United States, the Soviet Union, France, the United Arab Republic, Colombia, India and Ghana. "The committee," says its report released last week, "has been impressed with the existing imbalance and inequality in geographical distribution of staff." Of 1,245 employees at the level where the principal of representation applies, 760 are from North America and Western Europe, 84 from Eastern Europe, 294 from Asia, Africa and the Middle East and 107 from Latin America. The imbalance is still greater at the level of Under-Secretary and Director: North America and Western Europe, 27; Eastern Europe, 4; Asia, Africa and Middle East, 10; Latin America, 4. The committee agreed that this situation should be corrected and proposed a new formula which would reduce Western and Latin American representation in order to increase substantially UN personnel from Eastern Europe, Asia and Africa. The experts from India, Ghana and the UAR proposed the integration just below Mr. Hammarskjold of a "triumvirate" of Deputy Secretaries General who would be primarily concerned with political, diplomatic and *ad hoc* functions of a special character, including administrative and budgetary functions. They would be chosen by the Secretary General "taking into account the main political trends in the world today." This proposal is obviously put forward as a compromise to the Soviet "troika" system, and even though the United States experts took strong exception to it, it may find wide acceptance in the General Assembly. The far-reaching implication of the report is that the Secretariat will become representative, reflecting ideological differences likely to hamstring its capacity for independent action. When this happens, the orientation of the United Nations will change substantially and with it the organization's role in world affairs.

Since a reorganization – hence, a reorientation – of the United Nations cannot be avoided it might have been in the interest of the United States to initiate it. Unfortunately, the initiative was taken by the Soviet Union, and that has been deemed sufficient reason for the US to defend the *status quo* – an attitude that strengthens the belief of a number of non-Communist countries that Moscow is a "progressive" force for change. So far, the US has been content to rebut Soviet proposals on the ground there is nothing wrong with the organization. The arguments advanced have often bordered on the absurd. It has been stated, for example, that Khrushchev's only intent is to destroy the United Nations. If this is his purpose, he is following a curious course. To wreck the organization the Soviets need merely to withdraw, followed by the Eastern European countries, and to set up an international grouping of their own. As of that moment, the UN would die.

It is said also that the Soviets are using the UN to advance their own foreign policy. Of course they are. Every country does likewise. The United States has done so for over 10 years, and very effectively.

There is a consistency in Soviet behavior. The need is universally recognized in this atomic age for nations to pursue their aims by all means short of war, except that the Soviets have elaborated a doctrine (peaceful competition) for regulating East-West relations in such an age, while the US has not. The reforms the Soviets propose for the United Nations fall within the framework of that doctrine: The Russians see the organization as an arena where the competitive struggle is to be fought. But the Soviets do not *need* the UN to pursue a policy of "peaceful coexistence."

Lacking a doctrine of its own, understandable to all peoples, the US embraces a vague internationalism, usually translated in the standard phrase: "Support for the United Nations." But the United Nations is no common denominator; the aims embodied in its Charter are not interpreted in the same way by the Russians or by a majority of the Afro-Asians as they are by the United States.

What will happen should the UN, despite our efforts, undergo such changes that we will not feel like supporting it any longer? What answer would the US then give an anxious world to the biggest question of our time: how will we regulate the relations between power blocs? Once the organization ceases to be less Western in outlook in order to be more responsive to the new Afro-Asian countries and to the Soviet Union's increased influence in world affairs, it will not be possible for the United States to take refuge behind a vague internationalism and an even vaguer "support for the United Nations." The urgent problem is not what the world will be like 100 years hence, but how the UN can help in crises threatening the peace *now;* how it can be rendered effective so that, for example,

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it might usefully intervene in Angola tomorrow.

Secretary General Hammarskjold, who more than any other man has tried to steer the UN toward higher forms of international conduct, is living proof of the danger of neglecting immediate realities. His principle of "preventive diplomacy," that is, establishing a UN presence in critical areas not yet unduly subjected to Cold War pressures, could have proved effective only on condition that the US and the Soviet Union were willing to cooperate. This in turn presupposed a *detente* between East and West. "Preventive diplomacy" implies cooperation; "peaceful coexistence" implies competition. The former is inconsistent with Soviet policies, and by Soviet definition therefore the Secretary General's initiatives are merely "Western imperialism."

The stumbling blocks along the road to that world ruled by law, so often mentioned in the West, are many and not all attributable to the Cold War or the inequalities between the Northern and Southern parts of the globe or to racial feelings that run so deep. There is first of all the unwillingness of all countries to jeopardize what they consider to be their vital interests upon command of a majority. Khrushchev has said that even if 99 percent of the UN voted for a decision likely to compromise the development of Communism in his country, he would not abide by it. Undoubtedly, the US would reject a decision that it believed might imperil its security, even if the other 98 members of the organization so decided. Israel has never been willing to entrust its own security to the UN.

Another stumbling block is the breakdown in communication, so dramatically shown during the last session of the General Assembly. Words which delegates used continuously – Cold War, colonialism, neutralism, democracy, Communism – have no universal meaning. Each country is sure its own definitions are the only correct ones. The Great Powers have been criticized for trying to settle their problem outside the UN. A strong case could also be made against a large number of small countries which have proved unable to take a world view or to assume world responsibilities. They too have contributed to the paralysis of the UN.

If for these and many other reasons the UN is less than Western idealists would like it to be, something must be done to make it useful in the world as it is. This need, in turn, dictates some reorganization. The organization must reflect present reality. *It cannot be anything but the sum total of all the member states comprising it.* The UN Secretariat can only act effectively if its operations are based upon this recognition. It cannot operate as an independent and equal entity alongside the Security Council and the General Assembly, for though some interpret the Charter as granting the Secretary General this power, experience has shown that it does not work in practice. Dag Hammarskjold took a realistic view when he wrote in 1957: "The Charter, read as a whole, does not endow the United Nations with any of the attributes of a superstate or of a body active outside the decisions of Member Governments. The United Nations is, rather, an instrument for negotiation among, and to some extent for, Governments." In taking it for granted that the next Secretary General will be from a neutral country, most likely from Asia, a large number of states implicitly stress their desire to have an "uncommitted" organization – one that serves to smooth out differences rather than one that initiates moves presupposing a nonexistent solidarity.

None of this is cause for despair or abandonment of the UN by the US. Spokesmen for the world's nations are there; they are ready to listen; indeed they are anxiously waiting to know what policies the new Administration has to propose.

MARIO ROSSI

BONN'S MOOD IS ONE OF GLOOM AND FOREBODING

Recognition of East Germany

Vienna/Bonn

On a single day at the beginning of this month, an East German newspaper correspondent working in Western Germany was arrested on the suspicion of being a spy in the pay of the East German security services; a West German Bishop (of Paderborn) was refused permission to enter the East German Republic, although a piece of East German territory belongs to the Paderborn diocese; finally, a Social Democratic member of the Bundestag was called to account simply because he had visited Eastern Germany – without informing party headquarters.

The three events had this in common – they illustrated the ever-widening division of the two German states from one another. Suspicion does not attach

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only to West Germans wanting to pay formal or harmless visits to the East German Republic; it applies equally to any East German, other than a refugee (who must prove that he is one, too), who visits the Federal Republic. It makes the division of Germany a reality.

This reality was the starting-point for that part of the Kennedy-Khrushchev talks in Vienna which dealt with the German problem. The most operative points, as far as Germans are concerned, were Khrushchev's insistence on signing a peace treaty with one or both German states this year, his desire to have talks on Berlin at some future, unspecified date, and his obvious interest in trying to obtain diplomatic recognition – outside the Soviet bloc – of the East German Republic. Consternation in Western Germany has been heightened by Khrushchev's demeanor at Vienna, which was unhurried, resolute and haloed by an aura of reasonableness which may have a considerable effect on the uncommitted countries and on those citizens in Western countries who do not see why their fingers should be burned over the German problem. Such people may be motivated by a distrust of the West German state, even by a vague hope of satisfying the Communist bloc, but more usually they simply accept the division of Germany as the product of "Hitler's War."

The proposal last year of the Swiss philosopher, Karl Jaspers, that the division of Germany should be accepted but that in return the East German Republic should be granted democratic freedoms, was greeted in Western Germany with a howl of fury. The suggestion of the *Manchester Guardian* that West Berlin plus its inhabitants should be "transplanted" onto West German soil, in return for the cession of East German territory and a million and a half inhabitants, was dismissed with supreme scorn. Only a few weeks ago Professor Ruestow, of Heidelberg University, caused amazement when, in a lecture to the Evangelical Academy of Tutzing, he said that it was "typically German" to demand reunification and to fail to regard the setting free of 17 million East Germans as by far the most important objective. His listeners could not believe their ears; for they have had dinned into them unceasingly the refrain that reunification must, will someday take place.

However unattainable it may seem to an unbiased observer, reunification is still an unassailable dogma. This is why the West German argument for holding Berlin differs from the argument of the Federal Republic's NATO partners. Whereas they believe that they must maintain the freedom of 2.5 million West Berliners, Germans see in Berlin the hope of German unity. If Berlin were lost, they believe, then the division of Germany can be endlessly prolonged. This is the truth which hides behind the smokescreen of German declarations that "he who holds Berlin holds Germany, and he who holds Germany holds Europe," and that the fall of Berlin would presage the advance of Communism to the Rhine and the English Channel.

The dogma of reunification means, too, that no West German government will formally recognize the East German regime. Reference to the East German Republic as the "Soviet Zone" or the "so-called German Democratic Republic" is not a piece of byplay; it represents the belief that recognition of the East German regime will make the division of Germany more absolute. This is why the "Hallstein Doctrine" was evolved, laying down that diplomatic relations would be broken off with any state which recognized the East German Republic. This is why the Federal Government considered recalling (but has not recalled) its ambassador from Cairo when an East German consulate was established a few weeks ago in Damascus, and why there was a feverish interchange of notes with Brazil when President Quadros sent an envoy to East Berlin.

The threat to the dogma of reunification is the primary reason for the mood of extreme gloom in Western Germany since the Vienna meeting. If the Soviet Union signs a peace treaty with the East German Republic, will politically uncommitted countries be far behind? The odds are that they would not delay long. And influential voices have already been raised in Western countries in favor of a *de facto* recognition of the Ulbricht regime; these voices would multiply if it became sure that this was the best way of safeguarding the people of West Berlin and of the Allied garrisons there. Both Khrushchev and Ulbricht know this; that is why they are highly unlikely to exert physical pressure on West Berlin but almost certain to use the Berlin issue as a lever. Thus the West can be induced to accept the division of Germany as lasting, while the consolidation of the East German state by the Communists can proceed with greater speed and certainty.

Nobody has greater cause for gloom than Dr. Adenauer. With the Federal elections only three months away, he has contrived to be as soothing as possible since Vienna, for a widespread sense of worry would not help him at the polls. Obviously there would be a tendency to blame him and his government. As soon as the elections are over Adenauer will have to press his partners to evolve a Western initiative over the German problem. He will have to marshal again all his arguments in favor of German reunification, and show a new flexibility of mind and method. At the age of 85, this is asking a great deal of him, and he will be unhappily aware that Khrushchev's "soft line" will, if pursued successfully, leave only one avenue open to German reunification. That is the avenue leading by way of a two-state "confederation." It is a supremely dangerous avenue for German democracy.

Terence Prittie

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Ambassador Stevenson's Mission

Rio de Janeiro

When Ambassador Stevenson set out to visit the 10 South American capitals as the personal envoy of the President he had few illusions: "good fences make good neighbors," and the fences had been badly damaged by our entrapment on the beaches of Cuba. In addition to "explaining" Cuba, Mr. Stevenson had the task of preparing the ground for the special economic and social conference of the Organization of American States scheduled for July, in Montevideo. He was told on the eve of his departure from the US, as he himself confessed to a big and cordial press conference in Rio de Janeiro, that "his mission was to visit the friends of the United States in Latin America and that he would be back on the same day."

He found more friends than he expected. Brazil's Janio Quadros received him as a "great and good friend." Leading newspapers referred to him as the "ideal representative" because of "his liberal intellectual brilliance and his deep and sincere social-mindedness." They call him a "brave and gallant champion of democracy." Mr. Kennedy's popularity, bruised by the Cuban affair, had bounced back after his conversations in Europe and the speeches he made upon his return to Washington. Ambassador Stevenson was not, therefore, forced onto the defensive about the President, and that was a great boon. Yet the visit was marred by anti-American demonstrations that have become so common. An Embassy car was burned in Caracas; USIS windows were smashed in a half-dozen cities; five persons were injured in student demonstrations in Peru; two US newsmen were stoned by a crowd of 50 in Quito, Ecuador; anti-government riots in Bolivia during Stevenson's meeting with President Paz Estenssoro resulted in five deaths. And leaders of the democratic opposition to the Paraguayan dictator, including Luis A. Resek ("Arrest in Asuncion," *NR*, Feb. 6, 1961), were jailed within hours of their talks with Mr. Kennedy's personal emissary.

Fence Mender

Though many of the governments received Stevenson with open hearts, they did not do so with open arms. Some disagree flatly with Washington on the nature of the Cuban threat and what to do about it. They believe that the problem is essentially bilateral and can be solved by mediation between Washington and Havana. Brazil's Foreign Minister Afonso Arinos said recently that the Communism of Cuba has not yet been established by the machinery of Consultation existing in the OAS and that until these juridical steps are taken Brazil cannot adopt *in toto* the US point of view. Stevenson, just as flatly, restated the view that Communism in Cuba, not Fidel or Cuba itself, is a multilateral problem that requires collective action by the Organization of American States.

These official reservations, which prevented some South American governments from going as far as they might like – or as far as Mr. Stevenson wished – in supporting the Alliance for Progress, were matched by popular and press reservations. The inclusion of a visit to dictator Stroessner of Paraguay after Mr. Stevenson had lambasted all dictatorships in no uncertain terms, caused a very negative reaction. And even his explanation that he was visiting all 10 capitals and was not following either his own whims or the caprices of the State Department did not satisfy his interviewers.

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These unfavorable reactions could have been avoided if Washington had made public the whole itinerary in advance. Midway in his travels, Stevenson told reporters he felt confident that the South American countries would put their weight behind the Alliance for Progress and that a more intimate spirit of hemispheric cooperation was a-borning. But the stress was on what will be, not what is.

Because of the key position occupied by Brazil in the inter-American family and because Brazil's dynamic President is converting his country into a major world power, it is here that Ambassador Stevenson may have achieved his greatest success. A two-and-a-half hour interview with Janio Quadros (30 minutes had been scheduled), and the cordial statements of both after the event justify the belief that Mr. Stevenson's guarded optimism about closer Brazil-US relations is to a large degree justified. And, if justified, this means that half of Latin America is being won by the Kennedy Administration, and that President Quadros may become the *deus ex machina* who will change the course of future inter-American relations.

There were various circumstances that helped the Quadros-Stevenson talks. President Quadros had just received a merciless pounding in Brazil for his foreign policies, notably toward Cuba, toward the Iron Curtain countries, and especially, toward East Germany, where a young, itinerant, and maladroit envoy of Quadros signed "something" which upset Bonn, the Brazilian Foreign Office and liberal public opinion, and caused a distinguished Brazilian diplomat to resign. The almost violently-voiced and written criticisms came just as strongly from Mr. Quadros' personal and political friends as from his political foes.

Also while Mr. Stevenson was in Brazil, the vast Northeastern regions with their 20 million underprivileged (one-third of the country's population) seemed about to explode. Student strikes in Recife, the capital of Pernambuco State (governed by a Communist mayor) and depredations of private sugar mills by the Communist-directed Peasant Leagues punctuated the Quadros-Stevenson talks and caused the Brazilian President to listen more sympathetically than he might have otherwise. Then too there was the fact that Brazil and the US had just signed a $2 billion credit-loan-and-postponement-of-payments deal which had brought tremendous relief to the Brazilian Administration.

By showing an intimate knowledge of the dangerous situation in the explosive Northeast and by pledging immediate US support to President Quadros in solving the problems of that area, Stevenson went far in convincing Quadros that US policy is more than promises. In turn, Mr. Stevenson discovered that Brazil and its "sophisticated group of economists" had gone farther than any other country in planning for the implementation of the Alliance for Progress program.

If the observations of American and European statesmen and publicists are confirmed that President Janio Quadros, enigmatic though he be, may become the greatest President Brazil has ever had and that he may become one of the world's great statesmen, then the seeming success of Ambassador Stevenson in allaying Quadros' suspicions and in getting him to recognize common dangers may be looked upon as the greatest achievement of the 16,700-mile journey.

PAUL VANORDEN SHAW

The Revolution of Non-Expectation

by Margaret Halsey

All over the planet there is occurring a revolution of rising expectations. Sir Julian Huxley's phrase eloquently sums up the sense of increased possibilities now being felt by the hungry peoples and the colonial peoples of the earth. But in the United States, the richest country of the planet, we need something which is just the opposite of the upheaval that is taking place elsewhere. In this country, we need a revolution of non-expectation.

Ever since Mr. Kennedy became President, there has been a simple but mistaken premise underlying nearly the whole body of political writing and discussion. The premise is that Mr. Kennedy, through his native energy and by dint of hard work, can in a mere sequence of months repair most of the damage that was done by

MARGARET HALSEY *is the author of many books and articles including* With Malice Toward Some, Color Blind, The Folks at Home *and her latest novel,* This Demi-Paradise. *Her most recent article in* The New Republic *was "Stevenson: In '48, Too, They Said It Couldn't Be Done."*

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his predecessor in eight years of political inanition.

But cry, the beloved country. We need to know not only how much damage was done to the commonwealth by the indolent "man of good will." We also need to know how long it will take to repair that damage; and we need to have some idea of what steps should be taken to get us back to creative government.

Sacrifice What?

Currently, every intellectual with more than half a lobe to his brain is saying that we Americans have grown too soft and that we must make sacrifices in order to compete with Communism and win the Cold War. But these hortatory fellows, of whom the President himself is one, do not specify exactly what these sacrifices are to be, or who is to make them.

Shall we ladies, for instance, abjure the use of cosmetics and throw a lot of men in the lipstick industry out of work? And if we do, is there any way in which the money thus saved can be used to send American technicians into undeveloped countries where they will impress people with how much better our way of life is than that of our rivals?

The talk of making sacrifices is rather carefully left unspecific, since it is obvious that if such talk were definite, toes would be trodden on. But there is one sacrifice that could be made by everybody, with no inequities that involved one group at the expense of another. It would not be the comparatively simple sacrifice of material things. It would be the much more difficult sacrifice of a pleasant illusion, and it would consist in facing up to what we really did when we bestowed the Presidency for two terms in a row upon a student of cowboy literature.

So far, the whole subject of the damage done by the Eisenhower years has been tacitly evaded.

To be sure, a little mild criticism of the former President is permissible. It is fashionable to say that Ike, as the current phrase goes, "swept a lot of things under the rug." But once this admission is made, the unspoken assumption goes into action again – the assumption that pure industry on the part of Eisenhower's successor is all we need to carry us through.

But we need more than that.

We have heard a great deal since 1952 about "the Eisenhower image." What we have not heard enough of is the percipient comment of the English writer, Raymond Williams, to the effect that "Old images never die, they have to be publicly broken."

Mr. Kennedy has so far not pointed out in his speeches that much of the crisis in our affairs is American-induced and stems in good part from our own past behavior. Such a judgment, publicly made, would certainly offend both the former President and many of the people who voted for him. But is there any other way of putting the present situation in its true perspective, of heading off public hysteria, and of guiding the electorate in the direction of mature and responsible relations?

According to a recent issue of the *Wall Street Journal*, Mr. Kennedy feels that what Americans need now is a sense of urgency, and he is trying to evoke that sense of urgency by talking about intensifying the arms race, putting a man on the moon, taking a tough line with Castro, etc. But what the Americans need now is not a sense of urgency, but a sense of reality. If they had a sense of reality, no one would have to inject urgency into them, as with a hypodermic needle, from the outside. Their urgency would be self-generated, and as such it would be enormously more dependable and effective than anything which could be created by a studied manipulation of headlines.

A sense of reality in this situation means above all else recapitulation. Remembrance of things past.

It means that at least a certain number of Americans would be aware – and would say so – that what the American public went through with Eisenhower was a sort of electoral infatuation. So overwhelming was this infatuation that even the most hard-boiled political journalists treated President Eisenhower as if he were radioactive. They never approached him without the lead screen of talking about how "good" he was. But this talk only intensified a popular identification that many newsmen privately regretted, since the reiterated legend of Ike's "goodness" made the public at large feel it could share in that goodness by sweeping the General into office.

A sense of reality certainly does not require the delineation of the ex-President as a conscious villain, for Mr. Eisenhower obviously did not intend to leave his country as thoroughly in the soup as he did. But the acknowledgement definitely has to be made that such a man in such a job for so long a time is going to be followed by years of devastatingly bad news; and be the succeeding President never so "young," and Jackie never so pretty, and the advisers never so egghead, the skies will be black for a decade with chickens coming home to roost.

Kennedy's Popularity

The American public is required to sacrifice a pleasant illusion. And Mr. Kennedy? He is required to sacrifice popularity.

If Mr. Kennedy is thinking of the White House in terms of power and triumph, he picked the wrong President to succeed. If he is thinking of the White House in terms of admiration and applause, he should have let Adlai Stevenson wear sorrow's crown

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and lead the Ike-drugged Americans through a revolution of non-expectation. Then, after Mr. Stevenson had earned a martyr's grave in Arlington Cemetery, there would have been a time and a place for a young man in a hurry. There is no time or place for any such person now.

The pollsters are said to be reporting that Mr. Kennedy personally is just as popular with the American public as ever Mr. Eisenhower was, but that there is no support for his policies. Shouldn't it be Mr. Kennedy's first task, before he does anything else, to reverse that situation and gain recognition and support for his policies, even if in the process he himself becomes personally very unpopular?

As, of course, he would.

Popularity in our celebrity culture is several times more important than Tiffany diamonds or arterial blood, so it seems demanding and implacable to ask anyone to give it up, and particularly a person like John F. Kennedy who has not been accustomed to reverses. But tiresome as it has grown to hear it, the Americans undeniably have grown soft in their affluence and the crisis in which we find ourselves undeniably calls for sacrifice. And, as the lowliest platoon leader knows, the President cannot take his countrymen one inch in the direction of renunciation unless he can first demonstrate that he is capable of it himself.

Furthermore, there is no one else who can do the job of restoring a sense of reality to an etherized Republic, because the President is the only man in the country who can reach past the press and the newsgathering agencies and communicate directly with the voters. And how they need to be communicated with! The reporter Arnold Beichman, writing in the March issue of the English magazine *Encounter*, makes the point very clearly.

"In actual fact," he writes, "the American newspaper reader is a most imposed-upon human being. He is always being surprised at the turn of events. Whatever the fault or reason, the reader is always being baffled at developments in faraway places. How could he have known that Japan was the one place in Asia which the President of the United States could not visit as an honored guest? Everything had been going so well, it seemed, and then suddenly riots, screaming, a beleaguered limousine with the President's press secretary inside – how did *this* happen? And then there was Cuba with a popular democratic hero against a bloody dictator, a revolution which our best newspapers and analysts had said was the beginning of Cuba's great day. Suddenly it turned out Che Guevara was 'really a Communist' and Raoul, Castro's brother, was probably a Communist and so was his wife and so many others and lo! ninety miles off the Florida mainland there was now a Communist satellite – and when did *that* happen? And the overthrow of Syngman Rhee? And the collapse of the Summit last May and its aftermath? . . . And the time that Richard Nixon was spat upon in Caracas? Now it may be that the American Government knew nothing about these terrible events to come – but where was the American press with its 1,755 daily newspapers when history was in the making?"

The press has been featherweight and inconsequential about informing the voters, and only the President, because of the pre-eminence of his office, is in a position to talk to them.

Opening the New Frontier

Eventually, no one is going to suffer more in career or reputation than John F. Kennedy if the hidden assumption persists, at the root of all our political comment, that hard work by the new Administration will sponge out the Eisenhower era as if it had never existed. The Americans went through a political infatuation with Eisenhower as compulsive as Philip Carey's obsession with Mildred in *Of Human Bondage*, and the result is that the Soviets have eight years' headstart on us. Cuba was of a certainty only the first in a whole cornucopia of disasters.

In this situation, Mr. Kennedy has two alternatives.

He can juggle headlines and induce a state of national hysteria, as the Eisenhower chickens come home to roost. He can do this all the more easily because, as Beichman points out, news reporting in this country gives people only the foggiest notion of what is actually going on. But hysteria accomplishes nothing; and sooner or later the President will get the reputation of being an unlucky man. A Jonah, in fact.

On the other hand, Mr. Kennedy can abandon the popularity method as a way to open the New Frontier. He can move away from Eisenhowerism – that tussocky, squelchy mess on which the new Administration has been vainly trying to live. He can do non-Eisenhower things like backing the Freedom Riders to the hilt and getting rid of J. Edgar Hoover. This, coupled with a demand for certain clearly-spelled-out sacrifices, will get him support that so far he seems hesitant to ask for except on the same basis of nice-guyism as his predecessor.

It will not be a surprise to *all* the people in the country that Eisenhower was bad for us; but it might surprise enough people for Mr. Kennedy to lose out on a second term. If that is what worries the President, then he should go back a hundred years for precedent. This was the kind of risk Lincoln took when he removed George B. McClellan from command of the Union Army. McClellan, in Arthur Miller's deathless phrase, was "not only liked, but well-liked," but Lincoln weathered the storm.

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Plots and Counter-Plots

The fantastic American Republican Army which blew up three vital communications towers May 28 in Utah and Nevada in order to get some publicity for itself, apparently surpasses even the John Birch Society in the extent of its departure from reality. The John Birchers have not been accused, thus far, of destroying valuable property to accentuate their protest; so this new outfit seems to bear more kinship to the Wobblies and the older Molly Maguires than to the John Birchers.

All such things are public nuisances and potentially dangerous, but they are part of the price that must be paid for maintaining a free society. And both the John Birch Society and this new thing have at least the value of reminding the American people that conspiracy to subvert the government is no monopoly of the radical Left. The radical Right is just as capable of "gunpowder, treason and plot."

But what else, after all, is to be expected of a nation whose most trusted leaders have told it for eight consecutive years that it is living in an atmosphere of conspiracy, that half the world is engaged in a great and infamous plot against it, and that it can trust nobody? Least of all can it trust its own old confidence in "the safety with which error of opinion may be tolerated where reason is left free to combat it."

In facing a plot a counter-plot is the logical and perhaps inevitable response; and in a clash between plot and counter-plot reason is trampled underfoot. Yet if this republic was not founded upon faith in the power of reason, it has no firm base whatever.

However, no man can reason powerfully unless he is fully and accurately informed; and for many years this government has been conducted on the theory that the people cannot be fully and accurately informed. "Military necessity," they say, forbids it, although the great war ended 16 years ago. Thus we find ourselves committed to such things as the U-2 espionage flights and the Cuban invasion without knowing a thing about it. In both cases we were made to look foolish; and who knows how many other equally idiotic traps and ambuscades may now be in preparation?

The first, the primary military necessity is the necessity of formulating and pursuing a just and reasonable foreign policy in our relations with all nations. This over-rides all other considerations unless we are content to become an imperialistic power in the worst sense. American troops and American weapons ought not to be employed against anyone, anywhere, without the full knowledge and consent of the American people. Repelling invasion is no exception because they have given their consent in advance to that.

But if a small group of government officials claims the right to act in secret, keeping the people in the dark, it is inevitable that small groups of private persons will begin to claim the same right. Then we shall be bound to see a proliferation of secret societies that may claim to be, and at the start may in fact be motivated by patriotism, but that will inevitably go the way of the Ku Klux Klan, the Mafia, and other combinations that have attempted to impose their will by lawless force.

That would be the end of the republic as we have known it, for the fundamental principle of that republic is that "the will of the majority is in all cases to prevail," and nobody is going to shoot, no matter what happens. That principle has been repudiated only once, 100 years ago; and the lesson we learned between 1861 and 1865 was severe enough to be remembered yet.

Thanks to the friendly cooperation of the Mexican authorities, the American Republican Army is probably already finished as a threat, even to the American Telephone and Telegraph Company, but the fact that it appeared at all is reason enough for some very sober thinking. Added to the John Birch Society, the American Nazis, and the perennial Ku Klux Klan, it suggests the prevalence of a spirit inimical in the highest degree to old-fashioned Americanism.

But who first repudiated the ancient doctrine? Was it not the witch-hunters in Congress, from Martin Dies to Joe McCarthy? When the government undertakes to control opinion, whether by statute law or by withholding the information necessary to sound judgment, it invites unsound judgment that leads to conspiratorial action. When the government by its actions asserts the existence of a dangerous underground of the radical Left, it guarantees the organization of an underground of the radical Right, and we begin to assume the character of those unstable nations where power ordinarily passes by violence and not by the rule of reason.

No, the existence of the American Republican Army is not the shocking thing. The shocking thing is that we asked for it.

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South Africa–America Can Help

by Patrick Duncan

In November last year, I commissioned an article for the periodical which I edit on what the Kennedy Administration would mean for Africa. The writer read, among other sources, Kennedy's collected speeches. When she brought me the article her eyes were shining. "You *must* read *The Strategy of Peace*," she said.

"Why must I read it?"

"Because Kennedy's thinking is the finest thing in the world today. He's going to be President and this book lays down the line he will follow."

"Jean," I said, "you don't seem to understand. Those speeches were made by a young Senator. Now he is going to be a President, there's no necessary relationship between what he said and what he'll do. You don't understand these things."

"Please promise me you'll read it before you say any more," she pleaded.

And so I read it. I read it three times and annotated it. The book disclosed to me a mind that had seized the central fact of world politics and that intended to be headed off by no obstacles. I likened this mind in the world political field (for the world is now for the first time a single political field) to the mind of Disraeli in the English political field of the 19th Century. Let me explain.

In the England of the 19th Century Gladstone, the Liberal leader, discovered the potential political power of the masses and canalized it, by lowering the voting qualifications, into liberalism. By so doing, he threatened the existence not only of the Conservative Party, but also of the English upper and middle classes. Disraeli, the Conservative leader, did not blindly oppose the newly-enfranchised masses, though their widespread adoration of Gladstone tempted many Conservatives to regard the masses as their enemies. Instead, he wooed them by enfranchising them even more radically than Gladstone had done.

Since Disraeli's time neither the Liberal nor the Labour Party has ever seriously menaced the supremacy in England of the Conservative Party. Often the latter has been more militant in its attack on class privilege. That is the price English conservatism has willingly paid for the avoidance of defeat and of revolution for the nation. It is still paying that price, willingly.

Now at the United Nations, where the recently unified world political field can be most clearly observed, there is little doubt that the Western European and the American are the conservatives. The Communist leadership is the radical party and is having some success in setting the world's poorer South against the more prosperous North, while the newly-enfranchised Asian, African and Latin American people parallel the 19th Century masses in England.

Between the rich and poor in Disraeli's England lay a gulf, and it was he who spoke of the "two nations," so great was that gulf. Between the world's rich and the world's poor today lies the gap to which President Kennedy is so sensitive. "It is this gap," he wrote, "which presents us with *our most critical* challenge today." (My italics.)

The meaning of President Kennedy's speeches, as I understood them, was that he planned to meet the Communist leaders' challenge as Disraeli met the Liberal challenge, by undercutting and outbidding them. Kennedy speaks of the worldwide revolutions "now under way . . . in Asia, the Middle East and Africa." This is "the revolution of industrialization . . . of colored people to shake off the badge of inferiority white people imposed on them. . . ."

"If the title deeds of history applied," runs the [to me] key passage of this remarkable book, "it is we, the American people, who should be marching at the head of the worldwide revolution . . . yet we have allowed the Communists to evict us from our rightful estate . . . we have been made to appear as the defenders of the *status quo*."

Something which reinforced my conversion to a belief in the effectiveness and purposefulness of the New Frontier was the African tour of G. Mennen Williams, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs. He told us, and the President supported him later, that he believed in Africa for the Africans; that all people, of all races, who had made their homes in Africa were Africans, and that America wanted Africans to have freedom at the time when the Africans wanted it. Later, Washington delivered a stern warning to Portugal over Angola. So far, so good.

But the real touchstone of American intentions in Africa lies in South Africa. If the United States truly wants to march at the head, then it must stand alongside Africa in the last and toughest struggle – the

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PATRICK DUNCAN, *son of a former Governor-General of the Union of South Africa, is a member of the national executive of the Liberal Party in that country and editor of* Contact, *published in Capetown.*

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struggle against apartheid. Unfortunately it is just in this area that there are signs that President Kennedy has not yet been able to impose his thinking on the policy of the United States.

This ambiguity, this lack of purpose, may be due to the $300 million invested by American businessmen in South Africa. Or it may be the result of purely military and strategic considerations. Whatever the cause, the following facts appall African nationalists and South African Liberals:

A. The United States Embassy in South Africa is still "For Whites Only." True, the color line was once broken, two ambassadors ago, when an American journalist, Mr. William Gordon, was asked to a cocktail party. But the experiment was not repeated and no mixed dinner parties have yet been held.

I do not blame the Ambassador or his staff. They serve the United States well and do not wish to make a radical departure from precedent, which could provoke an incident with Dr. Verwoerd's racialist government in South Africa. If a change is to come it must come from Washington.

The Ambassador has extra-territoriality, and could legally entertain anyone he pleases, despite South African racial laws. A consul has no such protection, yet the last Soviet Consul-General entertained non-racially and diplomatic relations were ended by the Union on

"Too Bad We Can't Leave the Whole Darn Thing"

this account. As the independent African states look to South Africa and compare the Soviet record there with the American, can they be blamed for questioning American sincerity?

B. Dr. Verwoerd's government makes great play of its anti-Communism. Sometimes even American officials are taken in by this.

On May 2, Dr. Angus Tresidder, in charge of all United States information activities in South Africa, speaking to an audience composed mainly of Afrikaner nationalists, said: "America regards South Africa as the country which must lead the rest of the continent. . . . South Africa is . . . known for the steadfast manner in which it opposes Communism."

But since Dr. Verwoerd is known throughout the world, and particularly in Africa, as a ruler who suppresses Africans, when he opposes Communism, Africans all over the continent think better of Communism. And when Dr. Tresidder speaks appreciatively of Dr. Verwoerd, Africans all over Africa think worse of America. Dr. Tresidder said in the same speech that "America and South Africa must stand closely together against the Communist danger."

C. The United States is cooperating closely with Dr. Verwoerd in the military and strategic field. This cooperation cannot fail to damage American policy in Africa. For the South African armed forces are not normal armed forces: the highest sources have told us that they are primarily designed to suppress the non-white South Africans.

For instance, the Minister of Defense, Mr. J. J. Fouché, said on April 26: "Internal security remains the first and foremost task of the Defense Force." Again, "the Minister of Justice, Mr. F. C. Erasmus, and the Minister of Defense, Mr. J. J. Fouché, have announced that the South African Police and the Defense Force will be reorganized on similiar lines so that they can provide a *single fast striking force to crush any uprising.*" (*Cape Argus*, April 26, 1961.)

The South African Government is not, of course, expecting an uprising from anywhere except the non-white peoples of South Africa. Arms are bought with the aim of defending a "white nation" against non-whites, who are more and more seen as the enemy.

Thus, some months ago, about a hundred British-built "Centurion" tanks (which could have been used to fight the Russians) were sold to Switzerland, and 80 "Saracen" armored cars (not much use against Russians, but excellent against African mobs) were bought. The South Africans, these enemies of Africa, are the people who are now negotiating to buy new American jet warplanes. These are the people who are on close terms with American service representatives inside South Africa. These are the people to whom the US Navy sent a goodwill cruise and, late in 1960, a sub-

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marine (the "Chivo") to cooperate in maneuvers.

There are not wanting military minds in Washington who cannot think further than the recently-built missile tracking station in South Africa. With the new accent on space there is a real danger that such voices may prevail and that America may forge real and lasting links with apartheid.

In 1961 the United States voted for a watered-down resolution at the United Nations on the Southwest African issue. It is possible to make a good case for the vote. The issue was whether action should be called for, or not, and it is possible to argue that *at this moment* sanctions are not feasible. But the decision to vote against action reminded Africa of all the ambiguous votes of the United States in 1960 – the support of Portugal (the worst African colonizer), against Liberia for a seat in the Security Council, the abstention on the resolution calling for a UN-sponsored plebiscite on Algeria, and the abstention on the key resolution authorizing the Committee on Southwest Africa to investigate the territory on the spot. Worst of all, the United States abstained on a resolution which called for a speedy end to colonialism, without mentioning a target date.

As a liberal South African, I hope, of course, that President Kennedy will be strong enough to impose his ideas and remove these offenses. But more than the mere removing of offenses is called for. The Communist bloc is pouring money into South Africa. Much of the finance for the abortive end-of-May strike was brought to South Africa by a well-known African nationalist leader who had visited Peking and Moscow. This support is given to stimulate real opposition to apartheid and to help pro-Communists into positions of leadership in the liberation struggle.

Since under an increasingly Nazi-like government normal methods of open political opposition will become decreasingly possible, the West must either play a part in supporting unconventional opposition or leave the field to the Communists. And to leave this field would mean that once again, as in Algeria, the West would be forced onto the side of the *status quo*, because the side of progress and freedom would have had Communist help.

What Can Be Done?

Is it possible to see any sort of strategy at this stage? I think so. The first area where a successful breakthrough against apartheid could be made is Southwest Africa. The Union's title to the mandate over this former German colony is probably bad: a lawsuit now before the International Court of Justice is expected to give a decision on this point in a few months.

Let the General Assembly of the United Nations assume its rights and revoke the mandate, in accordance with the advisory opinion of the same court that the rights and duties of the old League of Nations toward Southwest Africa have devolved on the General Assembly. Let the United States decide no longer to hold back, but to lead in the matter. It will be easier than ever now that South Africa has left the British Commonwealth.

The revocation of the mandate will, of course, need teeth, just as other United Nations operations in Africa have needed teeth. This the United States must realize when it makes its decision on Southwest Africa.

The revocation of the mandate would be a shock which the apartheid government would be unlikely to survive. But if it were to survive the shock a liberated Southwest Africa could be the jumping-off ground for successful political action to end and replace apartheid.

Still, the question of revocation of the Union's mandate is for the future, though not the remote future. For the present there is something that needs doing urgently and can be done.

Neglect of its mandatory obligation to uplift the people means that the Union has educated very few Africans in Southwest Africa. Fewer than 10 have university degrees. Those with successfully-completed high school careers amount to a few dozen only.

What is needed is the establishment of an adult education college for Southwest Africa – and perhaps for other refugees from apartheid – something on the lines of Tanganyika's Kivukoni College, due to be opened this month. At Kivukoni no formal education certificates are required or granted. But a general background in political and administrative knowledge will be given men and women who have shown they can play a part in public life. Such a college is desperately needed for Southwest Africa and could possibly be established in Bechuanaland or Tanganyika by one or more of the great American foundations. Such a college might do much to avoid a Congo-like breakdown in the future in Southwest Africa.

A high-ranking American official once said to me that if the United States were to use its influence to end the apartheid regime it could do so. I believe he is right. And if he is right, then something of the responsibility for the continued existence of the world's worst racialist government since Hitler must rest on those in America who, having such power, refuse or neglect to use it. Quite simply, those inside South Africa who could help are afraid.

I submit that for America to be neutral in the struggle against apartheid is to neutralize American policy in all Africa. And if the new Kennedy line were to fail in Africa it must fail in the whole underdeveloped world. Such a disaster need not happen. But if it is to be avoided then the vision of *The Strategy of Peace* will have to be translated at an early date into action.

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Poor Railroads, Poor Passengers

by Asher Brynes

In 21 out of the past 25 years the railroads have earned deficits on their passenger operations. They made passenger money only in the war years when automobiles were in short supply, gasoline was rationed, and great numbers of troops and relocating workers and their dependents had to be shuttled from place to place in this vast country. The total profits of 1942 through 1945, however, amount to much less than the railroads lost on passenger service in any pair of years since 1946. If it were not for the revenues earned on freight service, which has run well in the black all the time, most would have been thrown into bankruptcy long ago.

Few people realize the comparative size of the freight operation in this industry. To handle it the railroads have to use more than 50 times as many freight cars, even if all the varieties of Pullmans, and the diners, and the self-propelled interurban and commuter cars that are utilized to carry passengers are counted too. In fact all of the latter barely equal, in total, the number of locomotives in daily use. And in freight service the efficiency of railroads is undisputable. They can and do beat the competition of other forms of transportation in the haulage of practically everything except the heaviest bulk cargoes, and lose this special type of business only to barge lines, pipelines and coastwise shipping, where such facilities happen to be available. Specifically, they produce about six times as much freight service per worker as long-distance truckers, and over three times as much per gallon of fuel consumed; and this situation is reflected in their schedule of rates. Average charges for freight shipped by rail are 1.5 cents per mile, by truck 6 cents, by air 25 cents.

Efficiency in passenger service is a more difficult matter to determine. Long-distance travel by air is often cheaper because of its speed. In the air transport business, equipment and employee time, on a passenger-mile basis, is cut down so drastically that airlines can provide a more economical service on some of their runs. This particular matter is, however, deeply controversial. The railroads claim that airlines receive a variety of subsidized services and tax exemptions from federal, state and local governments. Passenger buses undercut railroad fares on short as well as long routes – but they also do not, according to the railroads, pay the full cost of their share of use of public facilities.

Much the largest proportion of intercity passenger travel in the United States, however, about 90 percent, goes by *private* carrier. Practically all American travelers prefer to ride by automobile, their own automobiles, no matter how much more it costs in time, money, and other wear and tear on the human physique. An advertising man has coined a clever phrase for the self-steered transportation that Americans like so much: *freedom to go.* It has a spiritual value, apparently, that is beyond price. But no matter how much we may wish to indulge in it, automobile traffic is bogging down in urban congestion. It will come to a smothered halt, except on throughways, in the cities of the future.

Then the fortunes of the commuter and interurban railroads will shine again. They have a unique ability to handle high-density passenger traffic. There is, for instance, a double-track railroad line running down the center strip of the 8-lane Congress Street Expressway in Chicago. Those two tracks, utilizing present day equipment, have the passenger-carrying capacity of 24 lanes, or three Congress Street Expressways. And they cost less than half as much to build, mile for mile.

Today the nub of the problem is that railroad passenger service, particularly for commuters, is growing more essential with the concentration of our population in metropolitan areas; and the industry shows a decreasing capacity to provide it. For freight earnings are the financial muscles of the business, and they have been declining steadily over the past five years. Net railway operating income from freight service shows the following trend (these statistics are from Interstate Commerce Commission reports):

1956	$1,765 million
1957	1,646 million
1958	1,370 million
1959	1,290 million
1960	1,070 million

Over this period the deficits on passenger service averaged about $600 million each year.

Human nature being what it is, even in that most bureaucratic of private occupations, railroad management, it's no wonder the industry has allowed the quality of passenger service to deteriorate to the point where train riders immobilized in waiting rooms or club cars pass easily from talk of the weather to matching tales of complaint, yarn for yarn. Cumulative figures on earnings and deficits hide a good deal of variation between different railroad companies, as in any other business. Generally speaking, however, and this is conceded by a release distributed a few weeks ago by the Association of American Railroads, "since the advent of

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the streamlined age most passenger enterprise has been shown by Western roads, but in the freight field the pattern seems to be for Eastern roads to initiate any general speedup." They are too hard pressed, in fact, to provide the fast, punctual passenger service, the special observation cars, the considerate treatment that is fairly common once one crosses the Great Divide of the American railroad industry – the Mississippi River.

What the roads in the East are going after with grim determination is freight business. Within the past year they have increased the aggregate freight mileage which they operate at express train speeds (defined as a consistent 50 miles per hour or better) by 55 percent, "a far greater gain over a single year than has ever been made in the passenger field, even in the halcyon years just preceding and immediately following World War II." The New York Central, for instance, has added six new hotshot runs using new (Flexi-Van) equipment which "are writing new chapters in American and world rail history. For the first time a freight train is timed at better than a mile a minute start to stop. . . . Many of us will remember when such passenger times [the reference is to *freight*] were made on these runs only by all-Pullman extra-fare trains."

Even the Pennsylvania, the good gray mare of the railroad business, has instructed its engineers to run a new freight service at 70 miles per hour on unrestricted tangents over two long-distance runs. The Atlantic Coast Line has established an overnight piggyback service between central Florida and New York. Such fast haulage of truck trailers on flatcars has become so profitable that the faltering Erie-Lackawanna is reported to be considering the possibility of saving some of its money-losing passenger trains by hooking piggybacks onto them. Transcontinental freight runs, we are told, "will soon be made in 65 hours – even 56 hours." A generation ago the best passenger time for that trip, on red-plush extra-fare trains such as the Century and the Chief, was 80 hours.

Back to the "Octopus"?

Such efforts are fine for the morale of the falterers in this depressed industry. They show that the instinct for self-help survives adversity. But they cannot pull the railroads out of their deepening slump. More consolidations are needed, and these are being arranged too. Yet the effect of such mergers is essentially negative. Hopelessly deficit services are pruned away until none are left but (a) the profitable, and (b) the essential. If the present system is to be maintained, the railroads will have to be set up, finally, so that they are able to make enough money on the former in order to be able to carry the latter. But suppose – as many in the industry believe – the process of merger, even when pushed so far that there are but a dozen or 15 large railroads left in the country, still does not enable the industry to make good the losses on essential passenger operation? When that time comes and the industry's condition is such that it cannot be long deferred, we shall have to bring to this problem a new quality of thinking. It was easy to swat the railroads when they were monopolistic and charged all the traffic would bear. It was even easier to let the old regulations stand after conditions changed and new forms of competition in the common carrier business appeared. What we will have to do shortly is decide whether, as a matter of broad public policy, we want to allow the railroads to become so profitable that they are happy to carry the cost of their deficit passenger operations and willingly provide a high standard of service.

If that decision is made, we will have to think seriously of permitting the present railroads to diversify their operations. It is a fact that the services of but a single type of transportation are often insufficient today. A shipment may be best carried by rail, water, truck or air freight in various combinations if it is to be dispatched with the utmost economy and speed. The railroads argue that in the majority of such instances a shipper must do business separately, and time-consumingly, with the various common carriers involved. One transportation company in command of a number of such common carrier services could undertake to route shipments over the most effective combination of surface and air freight and thus, they argue, meet shippers' requirements for speed of delivery at reasonable cost.

What this amounts to is a bid for bringing the old monopoly situation, the "octopus" of the 1880's, back to life again. The amusing thing is that there is no express provision in any statute to prohibit this from being done. There is nothing in the Panama Canal Act of 1912, the Motor Carrier Act of 1935, the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 or the Motor Transportation Act of 1940 to prevent the railroads from buying into, and providing to the public, any mode of transportation, whether surface or air. They are now restricted to providing transportation service by rail, with few minor exceptions, as the result of administrative interpretations of these statutes by the Interstate Commerce Commission and the Civil Aeronautics Board. And if we continue to saddle them with the maintenance of uneconomic passenger services, those interpretations will have to be reconsidered.

What would happen if the administrative prohibitions set up by the regulatory agencies were reinterpreted and any common carrier – air, highway, water or rail – was allowed to combine with any other form of transportation on a simple showing of public necessity – as the phrase runs in this business – or consistency with the public interest? The basic economics of the

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situation would operate as surely as in naval warfare, where the 10-inch gunned cruiser simply has no chance against the 14- or 16-inch gunned battleship; the latter can stand out of range and pound the other to pieces. Railroads are the most efficient haulers of freight. They can provide the cheapest freight service and still make money on each transaction, particularly if they are given some relief from discriminatory taxation. Such relief (and more benefits too) is being granted to distressed railroads such as the New Haven at present.

The argument of the railroad business is that the principle of diversification is as sound in its application to transportation as it is to other industry. Removal of barriers to common ownership (of other forms of transportation) is necessary to alleviate in some measure a basic injustice under which railroads have long suffered. This is the injustice of requiring railroads to provide and maintain all their own facilities – and in addition to contribute heavily in taxes toward the construction, operation and maintenance of publicly-provided transportation facilities used by their competitors. If this injustice is to continue, the railroaders argue, it should not be compounded by denying to railroads equal opportunity to use the facilities their taxes help to provide.

A Policy of Concentration

But can we handle the monopolistic tendencies that would be unleashed by a favorable response to this plea? In the past, the country did nothing until the situation became scandalous; and then it proceeded to tie the railroads down in such a way that they are incapable, today, of adapting to new conditions. Still, we do seem to be able to regulate public utilities more effectively than did our ancestors. There are few complaints on the quality or cost of service provided by the heavily concentrated telephone communications industry. Recent events indicate that a similar policy of concentration will be adopted for the railroad industry. Curiously, the key to this development is to be found in what is currently happening in perhaps the most distressed railroad in the nation, the New York, New Haven and Hartford.

The New Haven is a notable example of what has gone wrong with the railroad passenger business, for it carries relatively little freight. Most of what it has originates outside southern New England and terminates on its lines, which means that it is chiefly a handler of such business for other railroads. Along its 229-mile main line, which runs between New York and Boston, there is one of the heaviest concentrations of population in the United States – about 10 percent of the nation's people in one percent of its land area. These people are served by splendid highway and expressway systems on one side of the railroad. "For the New Haven," says a recent ICC report, "the Connecticut Thruway is much like a Chinese wall . . . [it] runs so close to the railroad's line between New York and New Haven that industrial development capable of generating a substantial amount of rail traffic is hampered." Industries, in other words, tend to be zoned out of the immediate area served by this superhighway and, one might add, the suburbanites who live alongside it like to use their automobiles as much as they can; consequently, passenger as well as freight business is poor, considering the density of population.

The New Haven Railroad was organized on the supposition that it could be maintained as an old-fashioned monopoly. Its present form is a sort of minor monument to that prince of trust-makers, J. P. Morgan, who mortgaged its property to buy steamship lines, urban and interurban trolley lines and interests in other railroads to reinforce its control over the region it served. The consequence was that the New Haven's shareholders were practically dispossessed of their property by heavy mortgage commitments half a century ago. Since the last war there has not only been an absolute scarcity of earnings for shareholders, there hasn't been enough to maintain the rolling stock and roadbed properly either. Today the total amount of loans received and pending from the federal government to this one small railroad is $51 million. Further, the four states through which it passes have had to join hands in a program of tax relief and other financial aid to enable the New Haven to clean and repair its old equipment, buy new rolling stock wherever it is required and install mechanical equipment that will enable it to bring passengers to New York on time (last December fully one-third of its trains into Grand Central arrived late).

What the New Haven and roads like it are up against it can be seen in the one-way coach fares it claims must be paid to defray its costs in competition with one type of publicly-subsidized transportation: It costs 15 cents to ride from Grand Central to Mount Vernon on New York City's transit system. The New Haven runs a much poorer service over the same distance – and feels it must charge 74 cents.

If the American railroad industry really seeks to diversify into other branches of the common carrier business, and the volume of pressure with which it is presently advancing this argument can leave no one who is exposed to it in any doubt, it will have to show a willingness to absorb bad situations like the New Haven and run them, privately, as well as the English, the Japanese, the Swiss and the Scandinavians run their public railroad systems. The price may be high, but it is safe to say that full-scale diversification for our railroad industry can be had on no other terms.

This is the second of two articles.

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On Conformities and Fashions

by Irving Howe

Some writers have a special talent for bad timing: their tracts for the times seem always to lag behind the times. Had Mr. Freedman written his attack on intellectual "nonconformists" six or seven years ago, it might have received much attention: favorable reviews in *Commentary* and the *New Leader*, praise from the authorities of the Committee for Cultural Freedom, perhaps even selection by a Trilling-Barzun book club. But, alas, Mr. Freedman appears too late, and his book must suffer neglect. For he comes to the intellectual scene somewhat like a country-cousin blurting the phrases of the year before last and embarrassing his city relatives who secretly agree with him but wish he would realize that a little modulation is now in order.

Confessions of a Conformist
by Morris Freedman
(Norton; $3.95)

Simply as a book – which is hardly its main point of interest – *Confessions* is poorly written, ill-argued, and strikingly casual in the way it hurries through a large number of enormous subjects (13 pages on mass culture, 18 on advertising, 19 on education, 16 on God). Reading these feathery essays is like being condemned to study a bound volume of *The Reader's Digest*.

Mr. Freedman, who teaches English at the University of New Mexico, thinks that "all in all," though for reasons he does not mention, *Life* magazine is "all right." He finds cause to "marvel at the ingenuity, the oddness, the steady exploitation of freshness" in advertising and the movies. He complains that "the typical business man," despite "mountainous evidence to the contrary," suffers from an image of himself as "a Babbitt or George Washington Hill." Advertising commercials do not trouble him excessively, for "does not T.S. Eliot have a pitch [to be sure – *Shantih shantih shantih*] at least as forthright as that of the unctuous elocutionist persuading us to buy a particular high-finned car?" He likes "American movies, jazz, television, radio (including soap operas and disc jockeys), popular songs, animated cartoons, Broadway and Hollywood musicals . . . several mass-circulation magazines. . . ." But he does not care for New York and San Francisco, preferring instead to live in Albuquerque, New Mexico.

Very well; it's a free country. If one lives in Albuquerque, New Mexico, there may be some point in learning to dislike the two most interesting cities in the United States. And if millons of Americans have their minds violated and sense of language corrupted by *Life*, there will surely be a professor somewhere – as indeed here he is – to applaud the service. But what is remarkable is that Mr. Freedman feels that his compliance in quite ordinary philistine tastes constitutes a piece of news and its announcement an act of courage. So much so that these opinions, he gravely observes, "are likely to cost individuals professing them their jobs or at least their reputations" in the academic world.

Reputations we had better leave aside, but as for the loss of jobs, Mr. Freedman neither offers nor can offer a scrap of evidence. I very much doubt that anyone in the academic world has lost a job during the past decade simply because he held conservative, or extremely liberal, opinions. The only people who have seriously suffered *in that way* are sexual deviants and Communists: the rest is fantasy.

In his belief that he is battling the entrenched powers of an intolerant liberalism and demolishing the conventions of nonconformist conventionality, Mr. Freedman does not stand alone. He is repeating what was the very latest thing during the early and mid-fifties in the world of sophisticated intellectuals, the world that drew its sustenance from *The Liberal Imagination* and *The Lonely Crowd*, and could rise to passion about the moral value of firing a Communist teacher. Among such people there was an astounding delusion that to hold opinions which would seem commonplace in a small-town drugstore, abandon the tradition of criticism which had been a central value of American intellectual life, and become celebrants of our native virtues, meant taking large risks and setting forth new ideas. This delusion was entered into with a kind of manic complicity that may help explain such excesses as Mr. Freedman's claim to like soap operas: a claim that not his opinions nor even his tastes, but only his sheer wilfulness, requires. But now the fifties are done with, thank God, and the chauvinism of those years seems almost as hollow as the Communism of the thirties. Echoing the notions fashionable a few years ago in *The New Leader* and *Partisan Review* makes Mr. Freedman's book seem at least as quaint as if he were earnestly bent on reviving Transcendentalism or Social Darwinism.

When he starts attacking "nonconformist" intellectuals, Mr. Freedman is at once irresponsible and uninformed. Irresponsible, because he fails to specify whom he is talking about and resorts to the vice of anonymous polemic in order to set up whichever target he needs at the moment. Uninformed, because the people I would guess he is attacking – and his method allows no alternative but to guess – are not even described with reasonable accuracy.

"It seems impossible," he writes, "for the nonconformist to say a good word about a Republican or a Southern or a Texas Democrat . . . or a bad one about Henry James, Adlai Stevenson, Franklin D. Roosevelt, or Freud. . . . It is impossible for a nonconformist to believe that there may be any justice in the official position on Oppenheimer; to

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defend Western diplomacy on any basis; to invite company without candles on the table and without chamber music in the background. It is impossible to criticize Arthur Miller or Tennessee Williams. . . ." A bit later Mr. Freedman observes that nonconformists customarily hang "diplomas, especially beyond the baccalaureate . . . in toilets," and in a climactic outburst he writes that "what American intellectuals lust for . . . is that fantastically lofty status of European intellectuals, which requires that professors' wives be called 'Mrs. Professor'."

Now all this is wrong to the point of farce. Mr. Freedman should know, if only as a matter of fashion, that "nonconformist" intellectuals usually don't admire Arthur Miller and Tennessee Williams, consider it in bad taste to have chamber music as "background," and sometimes are critical of Oppenheimer, Roosevelt and yes, even Henry James. I have myself visited a fair number of bathrooms in homes of "nonconformist" PhDs, but have never seen a diploma hung in any of them. And as for Mr. Freedman's fantasy about faculty wives being called "Mrs. Professor" – has this man eyes and ears, and if so does he use them? American professors do not "lust" after very much these days, except perhaps foundation grants ; the very last thing they yearn for is, in Mr. Freedman's curious words, "the adulation once bestowed on nobility." One need only visit a faculty picnic and see if *that* is what is troubling them.

What is fundamentally wrong with Mr. Freedman's approach is its levelling of serious problems and momentary fads, its "colorful" mixture of Western diplomacy and candles on the table, T. S. Eliot's "pitch" and that of the TV announcer, Texas Democrats and diplomats in bathrooms. Like all devices for imposing "color" on weak prose, it can only lead to a trivializing of thought. It dissolves the differences between idea and fashion, so that the problems raised by the critics of intellectual conformism are reduced to an item for parlor games and for genial treatment by Mr. Russell Lynes, the authority on salad bowls. Everything now becomes a strategy for marginal differentiation, a means of indicating through the externals of manner an unearned claim to distinction. It hardly matters whether you drive a Pontiac or a Portia, whether you are square or hip, since both sides in these sets of oppositions accept the premise that issues can be scaled down to stylization, display and fashion.

When the problem of conformity was first seriously raised about eight or ten years ago, those of us who wrote about it had in mind not so much shadings of taste as fundamentals of opinion and value. We surely didn't like the esthetic horror of American cars, but our concern was less with that horror in its own right than with the nature of a society which, having mass-produced it, could persuade millions of people to find it attractive. The reason we raised the cry against conformity was a wish to pose as sharply as possible certain political and cultural questions: what is to be the relation between the intellectual and American society? should he continue to speak as a critic of the *status quo* and remain the man who permits himself the necessity of utopian speculation, or should he become part of the Establishment, assigning it his talent and intelligence, discovering the charms of responsibility, and with time perhaps helping to arrange invasions of Cuba?

Now it may be that this way of putting it is as wrong as it is admittedly simplified. It may be that the answers people like myself gave were irrelevant and obsolete. But at least we were trying to deal with ideas in their own right, at least we were not willing to reduce the problem of intellectual criticism to a symptom of social status.

The cry against conformity, which in its serious expressions had a political and intellectual purpose, was soon seized upon, watered into popularity and even transformed into a catchword of our conformist culture. It became possible, though not easy, for someone to write as bad a book attacking conformity as Mr. Freedman has written defending it. Even serious people like Sidney Hook kept repeating that there was nothing necessarily better about being nonconformist than conformist, it all depended what one conformed to *etc., etc.:* which was true so long as the points at issue concerned details of dress, food, clothes and cars, but was manifestly not true in regard to politics and culture.

After a time it became clear that everything was very confused. Intellectuals had often complained that society ignored or rejected their ideas; they did not dream of what might happen when, for reasons of its own, society learned to "utilize" those ideas. During the past two decades the most remarkable trait of American culture has been not its conformity, nor its conservatism, nor even its dullness; it has been an unprecedented capacity for assimilating everything, both lavish praise and severe attacks, on its own terms. ("To make enemies," wrote Howells, "is perfectly easy; the difficult thing is to keep them.") Assaults upon mass culture became an indispensable element of mass culture: the spice for the stew. *One idea seems as good as another because none seems to matter very much* – this amiably nihilistic version of *chacun à son gout* is the most authentic sentiment of the age.

If what I am saying is at all true, we had better conclude that dissident intellectuals must now try to translate their opposition to conformity into terms that are explicitly political, and not merely cultural. Language goes dead much faster than ideas, and the writings of the Freedmans on both sides makes it necessary to find new and more precise terms for continuing the dispute. Meanwhile it would be useful that some clear memory be preserved, in our memoryless culture, of what all the talk about conformity really meant these past few years.

Summer Schedule

During the summer months, *The New Republic* will not appear on the following dates:

July 17 July 31
August 14 August 28

Weekly publication will be resumed with the issue dated September 4.

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Nose-Counting on the New Frontier

by Frederic W. Collins

When economic archaeologists at last unearth the real cause of recovery from the 1959-60 recession, they will find it lay in a sharp rise in employment due to a sharp rise in the production of books, all about President John F. Kennedy, the men around John F. Kennedy, the first hundred days of the Kennedy Administration, and other matters related to John F. Kennedy. This is what might as well be described as Another One of Those Books. It is in the new format of hard-cover Washington journalism, for which the prototype was the admirable and successful "Candidates 1960." The trick is to round up a stable of newspapermen, give each one a subject related to some central subject, put the resulting essays together, buy a foreword by some electronic reporter whose name has more sales value than those of the ink-stained wretches (Eric Sevareid in the case of "Candidates"; David Brinkley in the case of "Circle"), and get into print just as fast as possible. Robert B. Luce went a step further; he created a publishing firm, Washington's first, it is said, in the field of general reading matter. So, not only is Luce launching "Circle," but "Circle" is launching Luce. The book no doubt has immense value for the reader in Pocatello.

The Kennedy Circle
Edited by Lester Tanzer
(Luce; $4.95)

You will read a lot before you find a better profile on a public figure than the study of Secretary of State Dean Rusk contributed to this book by Michael J. O'Neill, the State Department correspondent for *The New York Daily News*, under the title, "The Quiet Diplomat." Rusk is a man who does not wear his virtues and capabilities on his sleeve, and the result is that he runs the risk of being considered short on both. O'Neill, not an ingenuous type, rates Rusk high: "But if Rusk's potential for high office had escaped the notice of the general public, and of the President-elect, it had not been missed by the men who knew him well, who had seen him in action during countless crises. To them – especially to Acheson and former Defense Secretary Robert A. Lovett – Rusk's extraordinary intelligence, his grasp of world affairs, his decisiveness and coolness under fire, his open-mindedness, his sense of history, and his moral conviction lifted him above most of the other men who might be considered for the critical foreign policy portfolio. . . ."

O'Neill marshals quantities of material to support these judgments. He does not waste space on whether the Secretary of State takes corn flakes or shredded wheat for breakfast.

The other persons treated, and the attending writers, are Theodore C. Sorensen (by Alan L. Otten); McGeorge Bundy, Walt W. Rostow, and Jerome B. Wiesner (David Wise); Pierre Salinger, Lawrence O'Brien, and Kenneth P. O'Donnell (Mary McGrory); David Bell and Walter Heller (Charles B. Seib); Douglas Dillon (Thomas B. Ross); Robert McNamara (Elie Abel); Robert Kennedy (Hugh Sidey); Abraham Ribicoff (Ben H. Bagdikian); Luther Hodges and J. Edward Day (Don Oberdorfer and Walter Pincus); Arthur Goldberg (Alan E. Adams); and Orville Freeman and Stewart Udall (Carroll Kilpatrick).

The adverse criticism generally to be brought against this book is that it attempted too much too soon. The mechanics of writing and publishing being what they are, the issuance of this book in June about a government matriculating in January simply did not provide enough time for knowing what these men are doing in high office and more important, for *thinking* about them as high officials. The man who occupies a cabinet seat, we submit, is a man different from the one who was counsel to the Senate rackets committee, or counsel to the AFL-CIO, or Congressman from Arizona, or perhaps Governor of Minnesota.

So we are treated to millions of details. The technique is that of seining in all the minnows in sight in the hope they'll add up to at least a trout. Inasmuch as the men under examination hardly knew where they were at or where they were going when these essays were being prepared, it is next to impossible for the writers to tell us anything meaningful about what kind of government may be expected from them or the kind of performance they are turning out. The pieces on Rostow and Bundy, for example, provide excellent background on the kind of men they have been, but were too early to deal with the manner in which an overwhelming by events had frustrated their function as idea men and forced upon them a preoccupation with policy and operations in current crises.

For the most part, the contributors are excellent reporters and have done a sound job with the available materials. The same thing, however, may be said in respect to the biographical material which showed up in the daily newspapers when these men assumed their places within the Kennedy circle. Such difference as exists is one of quantity rather than kind, and in a good many cases, the quantity is far greater than the subject merits. The electorate can exercise its franchise effectively for quite a long time without ever knowing that J. Edward Day joined in a raid on a girls' dormitory while he was a college student.

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

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The Strong Men and the Populace

by William H. Stringer

Vera Micheles Dean, editor of Foreign Policy Association publications, has collected eighteen profiles of men as widely differing as Nehru the Asian philosopher-king, Nasser the Egyptian opportunist, Nkrumah the Ghana strong man, Ayub Khan the military tutor in "basic democracy," U Nu the Buddhist parliamentarian of Burma, Romulo Betancourt the Venezuelan social democrat, and Fidel Castro the violent overthrower.

In the lot Mrs. Dean includes also several rather wholly emerged giants, namely, Khrushchev, Mao Tse-tung and Tito, and two who have departed this earth, Ramon Magsaysay of the Philippines and Kemal Ataturk of modern Turkey. Inexplicably she omits several other men of special significance; for instance, Sekou Toure the Marxist of Guinea, Muños Marín the effective democrat of Puerto Rico, and Prime Minister Tengku Abdul Rahman the sophisticated midroader of Malaya. President Diem of Vietnam would also merit inclusion as a West-supported leader under direct Communist sabotage; perhaps the publishers didn't think he would last till publication.

Builders of Emerging Nations
by Vera Micheles Dean
(Holt, Rinehart & Winston; $5)

How do these polyglot rulers retain their power? Scratch any one of them and you find a charismatic quality; there is great rapport between leader and populace. Gandhi's mantle fits Nehru. U Nu is virtually a Buddhist saint. Nkrumah is, to his own people, Africa's champion; Sukarno represents the random convergence of many influences which is Indonesia today; Julius Nyerere of Tanganyika signed the first agreement whereby a community of white African settlers accepted the authority of a primarily black African government.

If the portraits of these chiefs, who represent roughly one-third of mankind, do not come fully alive, it is because Mrs. Dean had few personal encounters with the men themselves. Seen close up, with their pet idiosyncracies and prima donna qualities, they become more human, more understandable. In this book they do not talk about themselves and their aspirations. Nor does Mrs. Dean trace their impact on each other, which has been considerable, beginning with the Bandung conference. So the characterizations are rigid, though the quotations are lavish from others who have interviewed these eminent men.

Perhaps the most useful portions of this book are the careful studies, preceding each regional grouping, of the problems and tides sweeping Asia, Africa, Latin America, the Middle East. How fast have the storms of nationalism blown up, how powerful has become the sudden impact of the shirtless ones and the peasants on the high deliberations of governments!

For one thing, we must not be chagrined if, except for India, Israel, perhaps Nigeria and portions of Latin America and a few more countries, the emergent nations are unable to make democracy work. Tribalism is no education for parliamentarianism. Old Asia does better than new Africa but corruption, inexperience, and factionalism are world-wide.

Ayub Khan in Pakistan, as disgusted with the graft of self-seeking politicians as was Nasser in Egypt, drove out the parliament and is now seeking to teach the rudiments of democracy at the grass roots. Any diplomat in Karachi will tell you how vast an improvement the Sandhurst-trained general is over his predecessors. In Indonesia President Sukarno calls his regime a "guided democracy" – it is guided now by the military and again by a ministerial council which purports to represent all factions and professions. Learn-

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

Frederic W. Collins *is a veteran newspaper correspondent.* William Stringer *is Chief of the Washington bureau of* The Christian Science Monitor.

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ing to make representative government function will be a long business. While one army clique surprisingly hands the reins back to an elected ruler, (U Nu in Burma) in another exposed area a Korean military junta drives out the faltering President.

"These nations will adopt authoritarianism," Mrs. Dean writes, "but, we must hope, not totalitarianism on the Communist model; will direct, but not necessarily control, their economies; will show concern for social welfare and encourage change amid tradition; and practice a policy of nonalignment similar to that followed by India."

To Americans who complain that a nation barely at industrial takeoff point wants to own its new steel plant or bicycle factory, instead of encouraging immediate capitalism, Mrs. Dean rereplies: "Irrespective of Marxist doctrine, the new government would have had to make plans for economic development, not because Russia and later Communist China made planning an article of Communist faith, but because at that stage a system of unbridled competition between private interests would have impeded the growth of weak economies in need of rapid and strongly directed modernization."

In discussing how the United States can help channel these rising expectations Mrs. Dean places overmuch reliance on utilizing the United Nations, especially in view of Premier Khrushchev's attempt to stymie its operations through tripartite control. But the UN does offer hope, when it can escape the veto, of providing a "genuinely disinterested paternalism" which can operate, as Dag Hammarskjold has had it operating, in the Congo – an international "presence" which has kept out the new colonialism of Moscow.

How do we handle the "revolution of rising expectations"? It is quite likely that bilateral aid programs, plus special consortiums such as the "Aid to India Club," will be the most effective way through which the US can help the underdeveloped world, though some types of educational and technical aid will go through the UN. Beyond this, if Ambassador Adlai Stevenson continues to promote friendship with these new leaders, if India plays its new role of encouraging sane viewpoints among the uncommitted, and if somehow the decay and infiltraton can be halted in Southeast Asia, it may be shown that Communism isn't the wave of the future after all.

MOVIES

Some Accidents of Truth

The murderess in Enid Bagnold's play *The Chalk Garden* says at her trial: "What I have been listening to in Court is not my life. It is the shape and shadow of my life. With the accidents of truth taken out of it." In his new film Henri-Georges Clouzot is concerned with these accidents of truth. He gives us a murderess on trial and shows us with flashbacks that the shape and shadow of her life are not the whole woman and do not explain the crime.

The Truth (Kingsley-International)
White Nights (UMPO)
Rocco and His Brothers) (Astor)

Clouzot, the director of *Wages of Fear* and *Les Diaboliques*, is noted for suspense created by ruthless verity of detail. *The Truth*, although it shows an adroit hand throughout, has no suspense whatsoever: not just because we know the ending but because we soon know that there is no surprise in store as to motive or circumstance. Basically the film is an account of a psychological conditioning and its results – a case history, not a drama. There is considerable interest in this but not quite as much as Clouzot thinks. The picture could have been profitably condensed.

Dominique, who is disliked by her parents, comes to Paris with her sister, the petted one. While the "good" sister studies music, Dominique seeks through pleasure the affection for

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which she is hungry. She meets her sister's boy friend, a conducting student, and they become lovers. But he soon is unfoundedly jealous, as well as intellectually bored with her; she still loves him genuinely, and the way is opened to a *crime passionnel*. There is a wry Clouzot touch at the end when the prosecutor and the defense attorney, who have been battling savagely, reveal their inherent detached professionalism. Lawyers don't die with their clients any more than doctors do.

Brigitte Bardot plays Dominique very capably. Miss Bardot has been the victim of a reverse Marilyn Monroe syndrome. Miss Monroe has been a hit with the intelligentsia; her status as sex symbol has spurred them, rather than otherwise, to hail her as an artist. The best-known American teacher of acting, Lee Strasberg, has called her a great actress. (Would he perhaps like that engraved on his tombstone?) Miss Bardot, on the other hand, who *is* an actress of some ability, has been dismissed as a Parisian popsy. I suppose it seems more daringly perceptive to see talent in a Hollywood cutie; any oaf knows that French film actresses usually have at least a little talent.

Clouzot has given Miss Bardot her best part to date and evoked her best performance. She is poignant as the restless, defiant girl who wants only to give herself completely and, when the chance comes, is incompetent. Her only social mode is flirtation, her mental range is narrow, her hunger for attention (because of her childhood) is large. Miss Bardot makes us believe in this inwardly stunted girl, inevitably doomed whether she murdered or not.

Three of Luchino Visconti's films have now been shown here: *Bellissima* a few years ago, *White Nights* and *Rocco and His Brothers* within the last month. None of them supports his reputation.

White Nights, made from Dostoevsky's long story, is a deliberate departure from the neo-realism of which Visconti was a pioneer. It is very much a "studio" film, with atmospheric sets and lighting. The story is transposed to contemporary Italy, padded with jitterbug sequences and a stereotyped prostitute episode, and completely misses Dostoevsky's point: *viz.*, this fulfilled romance is the only time in his life when this young man will come out of his shell. The film's handsome youth, whom other girls eye, will clearly recover and compensate. As the girl, Maria Schell laughs and cries, sometimes simultaneously; as the young man, Marcello Mastroianni proves again that he is as good an actor for his age as any in the world.

Rocco and His Brothers has been acclaimed abroad as a realistic masterpiece. To me it is distended, sententious, ostentatiously frank, fundamentally trite, and thematically unsuccessful. Its theme is the corruption of simple folk by modern city life – a Calabrian widow and her five sons (one of them a child) who come to Milan. But how does the city corrupt them? At the end one brother is a successful boxer, another is joyously married, a third blissfully betrothed and the Alfa Romeo employee he wants to be, and the child is loved by all. Only one brother, Simone, has gone bad, and he brought his egotistical sneakiness with him from the happy homeland.

This is the year of rape scenes. *Two Women* and *The Virgin Spring* contained rape scenes which were harrowing because they were intrinsic. But the one in *Rocco* is just Visconti showing off, proving how unflinching he is. Simone finds out that Rocco is seeing an ex-girl of his. With a gang of bravos he surprises the pair, and while Rocco is forced to watch, Simone rapes the girl. It is disgusting because it is false; we feel that Simone would never have done it. He might have beaten up his brother and assaulted the girl, but the combination of the two is Visconti, not Simone. The fight that follows, with its sudden revelation of saintliness in Rocco, is another attempt to give depth to a shallow vessel.

In fact, barring the rape scene and the one in which Simone submits to a homosexual for money, this is a ponderous foreign version of those slum-family epics that poured out of Hollywood in the thirties. One recognizes the parts for Cagney, Eddie Norris, Beryl Mercer, Frankie Darro, Ann Dvorak, and Joan Blondell. It even reuses the prize ring as the poor boy's escape-hatch from poverty, except that Warner Brothers would not have cast Alain Delon, with Greek profile and stringy frame, in the champ's role as Visconti, the realist, has done.

The film talks tragedy where none exists, is full of labored symbolism (the girl opening her arms to receive the knife), and is laden with tastefully directed acting. The scene near the end where Rocco and Simone lie across a bed weeping and Mama comes in to collapse at their feet in hysterics is pure provincial-theater *prosciutto*. Nevertheless Paolo Stoppa, a fight manager, Suzy Delair, a susceptible middle-aged woman, and Annie Girardot, the tart bandied between the brothers, give good performances.

We are promised other Visconti films. Perhaps they will go further to explain his reputation.

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